

Unless the proceedings commenced to declare him an outlaw be completed before the election for Provencher comes off, he may safely count on re-election, to be followed by another expulsion. An earlier declaration of outlawry would have saved all this trouble and avoided some anomalous proceedings. Attorney-General Clarke asks us to believe that there was no judicial machinery by which the attainment of this object could have been hastened; that proceedings were commenced as soon as the Court in which they were taken was complete, and that only one step can be taken at a time. This throws us back, in search of the cause of the delay, upon the omission to complete at an earlier date the judicial machinery of Manitoba. Was it that the late Government wished to avoid anything being done to bring Riel or to trial, to pronounce him an outlaw?

The expulsion does not dispose of the question of amnesty, into which there was, at the time, a committee sitting to enquire. Mr. Holton took the ground that a motion for expulsion, pending the enquiry, was anomalous and unstatesmanlike. But the question of an amnesty relates to an oblivion of all offences connected with or arising out of the rebellion of 1869; while against the member for Provencher the evidence was clear that he was a fugitive from justice. The advocates of a general amnesty want it for the special benefit of Riel and Lepine. But there was really no reason why the expulsion of a member, charged with murder and evading a trial, should not take place while a committee was enquiring whether a general amnesty had been promised. From all that has hitherto been published on the subject, there does not appear to have been any express promise of an amnesty. Archbishop Taché, who has, in a pamphlet recently published, minutely detailed the part he took in the pacification of the Province, fails to show that any express promise was made. He appears to have inferred

from what was done and said that an amnesty would be granted; and it is evident that he acted upon that idea. How far did he make it the leverage for securing the object of his mission? If Riel and his associates who had taken possession of Fort Garry had, at his instance, evacuated it and laid down their arms, then the use he had made of a promise of an amnesty would have had to be taken into account. But Riel held possession of the Fort till he knew that he was on the point of being attacked by British troops and Canadian volunteers; and, after the time when what Bishop Taché puts as a constructive promise of amnesty was made, the murder of Scott took place. If the promise of an amnesty had been positive, it could not have been held to cover future offences, much less the crime of murder. There could be no objection to an amnesty, from which Riel and Lepine should be excluded; but it would be useless, since it would not secure the object for which the advocates of an amnesty desire it. Bishop Taché tells us, indeed, how much the country owes to the self-denying patriotism of Riel and his associates; of their refusal of offers of assistance from the United States to the amount of four millions of dollars. He is careful to tell us that this was not Fenian money. The information is quite unnecessary. The statement of this offer we do not doubt is made in good faith; but to accept it as correct requires an amount of credulity that not every one is blessed with. The men who welcomed O'Donohoe across the border would have refused nothing in the shape of men or money.

The final vote on the expulsion shows a parliamentary division coincident with the line that marks a separation of races and creeds. The rebellion itself had for its chief spur antagonism of race and religion. The end is as the beginning. We need not, however, be led despondingly to conclude from these facts that we are destined to have