the Department of the State, and such opinions in the courts, we shall soon find that no government will care to keep up extradition relations with us."

MULTIPLICATION OF REPORTS.

It is related of Lord Wensleydale that he considered a judgment imperfect if it did not refer to every case in the books that bore on the question in controversy. In a similar vein, Lord Mansfield said in *Rex* v. *Wilkes*: 4 Burr. 2549: "I never give a judicial opinion upon any point until I think I am master of every material argument and authority in relation to it." It was possible for these judges, living at the time they did, to give practical effect to their views. But now-a-days, such is the multiplication of reported decisions, that judges are inclined to enunciate very different opinions. For example, in one of the suits in the European arbitration, Mr. Fischer, Q.C., having cited cases decided by the Master of the Rolls and Lord Cairns in the Albert arbitration, Lord Westbury said he would, out of deference to the authorities cited, reserve his decision. At the same time, he remarked that nothing was so miserable in our law as the existence of any number of reported cases which might be cited in support of almost any proposition, reminding him of the saying that a certain person could quote Scripture for his own purpose.

While our system of law remains as it is, uncodified, subject to yearly expansion by legislative addition and modification, which is in turn interpreted, and sometimes only made intelligible by judicial decision, it is simply impossible to avoid the necessity of an interminable issue of reported cases. This being assumed, the best method of minimizing the difficulty of mastering the law is by ascertaining and adhering to some well-defined rules in the determination of what cases shall be reported. The vast multiplication of the volumes of reports which it is necessary for a Canadian lawyer to consult fills the mind with consternation. First of all, there are our own Common Law and Equity series, the practice cases, the decisions in appeal, and the new series presently to be issued of the judgments of the Supreme Court at Ottawa. Then, as the Dominion Statutes are common to all the Provinces, there will be decisions of the courts of one Province which the practitioners in the other Provinces cannot afford to overlook. Then there are, of course, all the reports of decisions in the English courts, which of themselves involve no small amount of labour and time to overtake. Besides all this there seems to be, both in the mother country and here, a hankering after decisions in the United States courts, which necessitates an overhauling of their multitudinous volumes, where certainly cases can be found going to support every possible view of every possible subject of litigation.

But, as touching cases which alone should be published, it has been well said that there are two classes of cases which are worthy of being reported. *Firstly*, cases which decide a new point or principle, such as those which settle the meaning of a statute which has not yet received a construction, where such construction was really doubtful in the absence of decision; or which lay down the rule of expediency to be applied to some new combination of elements in social, commercial or political existence, which the course of events brings forward. *Secondly*, cases, which though they do not decide absolutely new points or principles, nevertheless afford typical illustrations of the application of old points or principles to large or frequently recurring classes of instances.

Many lawyers, and even judges, advocate the printing of all judgments, the reasons of which have been written out by the judge. But we think it is not every considered judgment which should be reported. Every unconsidered judg-