

does not detract from the enjoyment of the music itself; it leads, rather, to greater intimacy with it. In subsequent hearings, the music itself takes the place of the story, since the listener has become as familiar with it.

Now, whatever may have been in the mind of a composer when he wrote an "Impromptu," a "musical Moment," a "Nocturne" or a "Polonaise," it is quite natural to a hearer's mind of literary habits to conjure up plots, characters, decorative scenes, upon hearing such pieces. Mrs. Wagnalls, combining in her person the functions of the writer and the musician, has developed this "musical imagery" to a finished art, and presents to her hearers, first the

literary version, illustrated by snatches of the music (giving the "high lights" of the picture), then the music itself upon the piano.

The first of these recitals aroused favourable comment in the musical papers as "something new and worth while." A writer in Musical America says:

"Reversing the order of the composer, who has for ages translated the written words into music, Mrs. Wagnalls has translated music into the written word, visualizing the images conjured up by the score into sketches of fancy and fantasy. Having won fame as a writer as well as musician, the blending of the two mediums of expression brought an entertainment of rare beauty and charm."

In a Zielinski Gavotte Mrs. Wagnalls finds the story of Harlequin and Columbine. In the F major Impromptu of Rubinstein she sees a lone troubadour "passing through a woodland at night, twanging on his lute to keep himself company, while over and again the warble of some strange night bird is heard, far and near, high and low, daintily, dreamily floating over the unceasing accompaniment." The F major Etude of Chopin suggests a vision of the old miracle play "Everyman," and so on. The Chopin Polonaise in D minor has been made, according to the Musical Leader, "into an exquisite fairy tale," which suits the music so well as to make one wonder if the composer himself had not had it in mind.

SIZING UP THE BRITISH DRIVE

By SIDNEY CORYN

TWO considerable battles have been fought within the last ten days, that is to say, two parts of the same battle. The first part was fought over a front of about ten miles immediately to the east of Ypres, and the result was summarized fairly accurately in the German bulletin, which said: "The enemy advanced one kilometer into our defence zone, and at Passchendaele and Gheluvelt passed farther forward. West of Passchendaele he was pressed back by our counter attacks. North of the Menin-Ypres road a portion of terrain remained in his hands." The second portion of the battle began on September 26th, and once more we may quote the German bulletin to the effect that "the battle in Flanders between Langemarck and Hollebecke—a front of fifteen kilometers—still continues. The enemy has succeeded at places in penetrating as far as one kilometer deep into our fighting zone, where desperate fighting is proceeding." The battle is, of course, a continuous one. It is only the actual assaults that are separated one from another. Zonnebeke is reported as taken, and this brings the British within six miles of the railroad from Ostend to Lille. This railroad is one of the great arteries of supplies for the German armies in the north, and it is significant that British ships bombarded Ostend while the land operations were in course of completion. The British front is now about seven miles from Roulers, where the German district headquarters are situated.

It may have been assumed too hastily that the object of the present fighting is to reach Zeebrugge and Bruges and so to exclude the submarines from those very convenient bases. An extension of the British advance would have that effect, but that is certainly not the only goal. Perhaps it is not the goal at all or only in an indirect way. A glance at the map shows that the direction of the advance is southeast as well as northeast, toward Menin as well as toward Roulers. It seems rather more likely that General Haig is trying to enlarge the great salient that now projects eastward from Ypres in the hope of dragging the German lines from their present position on the ocean and compelling them to fall back eastward along the coast. This would of course have the ultimate effect of uncovering Zeebrugge and Bruges, but it would do much more than this if it forced a general retirement of these northern lines, a retirement that would certainly extend far beyond the area of the present fighting. And we may reasonably believe that such a retirement must inevitably follow a continuation of the present British successes. It has probably already been arranged, just as the great Hindenburg retreat was decided on long before it was actually accomplished. The evacuation of the civil population and the many activities in road-making all point in that direction, apart from the obvious fact that the enlargement of the Ypres salient must of itself compel such a step, as will be presently explained. The obstinacy of the German defence in no way disproves such a theory of German intentions. An extensive preparation of new positions would be necessary, and we may remember also that Germany is about to float a new war loan, and this would certainly not be facilitated by the news of a fresh German retreat. There are other considerations that may find a place further on.

Although the reports are very meagre it is evident that there has been desperate fighting quite apart from the successful assaults that have been

reported in the bulletins. This is conclusively shown by the British casualty lists. For several weeks before these assaults were delivered the British losses were 15,000 a week, but during the last three weeks they have risen to 27,000 a week. The artillery fighting alone would hardly account for the loss of over two thousand men a day. The nearly unreported but continuous struggle for Lens is no doubt a costly one, but even then we must suppose that there has been plenty of heavy fighting up and down the line to produce such heavy casualties. We have no means of ascertaining the comparative losses of the two sides, but there are plenty of indications that the German forces suffered far more heavily than the British, and we can find such additional consolation as we may in the indisputable fact that the German armies are far less able than the British to stand so terrible an attrition. The reports of the German counter attacks that have been brought against the captured positions show a desperation, a reckless prodigality of human life, that can hardly be explained on any theory of military necessity. These assaults, renewed again and again, come to an end from sheer exhaustion, or after the practical annihilation of the German columns, and in nearly

blows. With every fresh offensive this salient bites deeper and deeper into German-held territory, and this fact can not be concealed—except perhaps from the peculiar German mind—by the slighting references to their gains that appear in the German bulletins. The constant enumeration of captured towns and villages tells its own tale, since all these places can be found on the map, and they show conclusively that the eastward bulge or salient before Ypres grows steadily deeper and wider. That the base of this salient covers only a few miles has nothing to do with the question. The value of a salient is to be found in the fact that it is effective over a wide area, while the actual fighting that is involved is over a narrow front. The salient that is being progressively advanced threatens to pierce the enemy lines, and if it can not be flattened back, or straightened, by direct attack, the same end must be attained by a withdrawal of the adjacent lines. The salient itself is, of course, peculiarly vulnerable to attack, since it is exposed upon three sides, and must therefore be defended by a correspondingly large number of men. It has the effect of lengthening the front upon both sides, since a bulge or curve connecting two points is necessarily longer than a straight line that connects the same points. A salient is not usually projected unless there are sufficient men to maintain it, but at the same time it demands a correspondingly large number of men to resist it. The salient that can be successfully defended and advanced is therefore a peculiarly deadly formation, since it compels a general withdrawal over an indeterminate area. In other words the salient must either be driven in, or the adjacent lines must be withdrawn to overtake it.



THE PEACE TERMS.

—Murphy in N. Y. American.

every instance they are fruitless. We have to go back to the early days of the war, when Germany's man power was so great as to seem inexhaustible, to find any parallel to the apparent indifference to loss now being displayed by the German commanders. It is explicable only on the ground of some necessity other than the purely military.

THAT the military situation is a serious one for the German armies is indisputable, even though it be inadequate wholly to account for the desperation of the counter attacks. A glance at the map shows that the British salient to the east of Ypres is steadily enlarging under the power of the British

WE find just such a situation now existing to the east of Ypres, where the map shows a sharp bulge with a base some fifteen or twenty miles broad. The battles that have just been fought have measurably deepened this bulge, and we may suppose that this was actually the British intention, and that the attainment of definite geographical objectives such as Roulers or Bruges was a secondary consideration. It is evident that such a bulge as this must have a dragging effect upon the German lines to the north, which must therefore be strengthened if they are to avoid being wrenched from their anchorage on the sea coast. Every mile that is added to the Ypres salient means an additional drag to the lines to the north—and of course also to the south—and unless these lines can be reinforced they must become thin and frail like a piece of rubber that is being stretched. Moreover, the deepening of the Ypres salient has already carried the British lines well to the eastward of the northerly German lines, which are thus in danger of being outflanked or attacked from the rear. At this distance it is impossible to say precisely at what point the deepening of the Ypres salient will compel the withdrawal of the German lines to the north and south, but that point has a definite location and it can not be very far away. To belittle the gain of a mile, on the ground that it is only a mile, is therefore futile. The gain of a mile may easily compel a general German retirement from the coast position that is now held, as well as from the positions in the south—around Lille, for example—and a general retirement is a very grave operation in the face of an enemy, and one that might easily slip downhill into calamity. That the Germans intend to retire is strongly indi-