

4. Harriman went on to say that he thought that when we read the report (we did not repeat not disclose our prior knowledge of it) we would be satisfied with it. He did not repeat not think that the references to the ICC would cause us any alarm, although he volunteered that the report had been prepared before his assumption of his present office and that he would have treated this subject quite differently. He then drew our attention to the main references in the White Paper to the ICC and invited my reaction.

5. Making it clear that I was speaking personally, I said that I would have no repeat no comment on the passing reference to the ICC in the introduction. As to the passage on page 24, however, (referring to the failure of the Commission to investigate cases of subversion and its inability to enforce effective control over violations), the White Paper seemed to me less than fair. Doubtless it had been prepared before the latest developments in the Commission; it failed to take account of the steps now being taken in Saigon to pursue investigations. Harriman fully agreed. I then went on to question the accuracy of the reference to the ICC's capacity to "enforce" the Geneva Agreements. Harriman broke in to agree emphatically and, turning in some warmth to Jorden, to say that it was of course obvious that the Commission did not repeat not have this power, that it could not repeat not control violations of the Agreements and that the passage in question was neither accurate nor a full statement of the facts; it should have been cleared by officials in the State Department who knew the facts (legal adviser) before it was approved for release.

6. During the balance of our discussion (Harriman having said that he would welcome my further comment), I drew attention to four points which I thought relevant to the White Paper's publication and its content:

- (a) current indications of a stiffening in the Indian attitude and improvement in the prospects for the Commission's dealing effectively with GRVN complaints;
- (b) the need to present a balanced and realistic account of the Commission's accomplishments and possibilities and to correct misapprehension of its role and capabilities;
- (c) timing of its publication in relation to the current situation; and
- (d) possible repercussions on the situation in Laos.

7. As to the first I said we thought the appointment of Parthasarathi as the new Chairman, the talks between Ambassador Galbraith and Indian officials in Delhi⁴⁸ and the earlier talks between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Nehru,⁴⁹ all seemed modestly encouraging. We believed that the Indian attitude in the Commission had already improved and that there was now a fair prospect that the interminable delays in the Legal Committee or in the full Commission in dealing with current issues could be limited. We thought it might even be possible that we could achieve concurrent action by both the Legal Committee and the full Commission in investigating GRVN charges if this course proved necessary. For these reasons we felt it important that nothing repeat nothing be said or done to make things more difficult for the ICC. Something might even be said to give the Commission a lift. Canada was not repeat not looking for either praise or sympathy; our only interest and concern was to get on with the Commission's business as a contribution to stability in the area and to do the best possible job.

8. Harriman did not repeat not dissent from my suggestion that there were encouraging signs. He hoped that we could keep in close touch on developments in the Commission's activities. As to Indian attitude, he mentioned that in an interview just before mine he had had no repeat

⁴⁸ Voir/See *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, Vol. I (Washington: United States Government Printing Bureau, 1988), document 313.

⁴⁹ Voir/See, *ibid.*, document 218.