

requested from all Latin American posts. The responses (Documents 613-620, 622, 623, 625, 626) indicated that while no major, fundamental changes were needed, a shift in emphasis was highly desirable in order to promote better Canada-US relations. A memo written in early October stated that Canada was prepared to make significant accommodations in the areas of trade and transport (Document 635). However, as Norman Robertson observed in a handwritten note on this document, the Canadian plan was soon "overtaken by events."

During the missile crisis, Canada took several steps in support of the United States, such as searches of aircraft en route to Cuba and provision to the US of passenger lists (Documents 672, 673). However, an early statement by the Prime Minister in favour of a United Nations fact-finding mission was wrongly interpreted as questioning the existence of Soviet missile bases in Cuba (see Documents 658, 662), and thus gave rise to a perception that Canada's support was only half-hearted at best. A subsequent, more forceful statement of support by Diefenbaker elicited the thanks of both Dean Rusk and Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy (Document 694). Nevertheless, Canada's ongoing efforts to find a solution through the United Nations were not received with great enthusiasm by the Americans. Owing to resentment on Canada's part of the Americans' failure to consult with their allies as the crisis developed and to resentment in the US of Diefenbaker's slowness in raising the alert level of Canadian military forces, the crisis caused a marked deterioration in Canada-US relations—an ironic outcome, considering the Canadian decision in early October 1962 to align its Cuban policy more closely with that of the United States.

Other contentious issues in Canadian-American relations included the law of the sea, ratification of the Columbia River Treaty, defence production sharing, and Canadian editions of US magazines. Ever since the failure of the 1960 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Canada had actively been seeking a consensus that might lead to a multilateral convention on the extension of the territorial sea and the establishment of contiguous exclusive fisheries zones. After March 1962, when it became clear that the opposition of US fisheries interests would preclude any American support of such a convention, Canada moved forward with plans for unilateral action. The negative response in Washington was unexpectedly strong, and officials there "made no effort to hide their concern and agitation at the consequences which they saw flowing from our decision" (Document 749). Rather than create "a new area of controversy in Canadian-United States relations," the Diefenbaker government decided to take no further action (Documents 750, 751).

Canadian ratification of the Columbia River Treaty, which had been signed in January 1961, was delayed by prolonged discussions with the government of British Columbia. Premier W.A.C. Bennett demanded significant changes to the terms regarding downstream power benefits and other related matters. These changes, at first deemed by the federal government to be impractical, later seemed more appealing in the light of data provided by the BC representatives (Document 281). The Americans, however, disputed the BC figures and denied that the new proposals were realistic (Documents 292, 299). All in all, the Canadian delays were a source of