

the affections of the living being, so far as these are wants. What is maintained is, that when these wants become objects of the conscious subject they cease to be mere wants or appetites and become desires, *i.e.* the consciousness of ends which the subject conceives as essential to his own completeness. And when the deeper meaning of the desires is realized, these conceived ends are seen to form a system within which the subject seeks to realize his ideals of a complete life. Just as the perceptive world becomes the system of experience, so the various desires, which at first appear as separate ends, become a totality of ends in the world of human interests.

There are certain wants which are connected with the life of animals, such as hunger, thirst, sleep, exercise, and repose. These wants, cravings, or appetites involve a certain feeling of pain, arising from the absence of what is essential to the process of animal life. Such wants therefore involve an impulse or tendency towards their own satisfaction. They presuppose the unity of the animal organism, but they operate prior to consciousness on the part of the being having them. The want is the feeling of incompleteness, and as such it is accompanied by the tendency to negate itself. We can distinguish the want from the impulse to satisfy it, but these are inseparable aspects in the total state of the animal. Now, such wants do not enter into the conscious life of the subject, so long as they remain wants; nor, when they do enter into the conscious life are they any longer 'wants,' *i.e.* feelings or immediate impulses. To be conscious that we are the subject of a want, is to make the want an object, and therefore to contrast