

*External Affairs*

**Mr. Browne (St. John's West):** No, that we were not there to defeat communism.

**Mr. Pearson:** Well, I am willing to accept that. He challenged me—this is the way he put it and if he looks at *Hansard* he will change his mind—to justify my statement that our objective in Korea is to defeat aggression, and that is our only objective in Korea. All the hon. gentleman has to do to accept that fact is to read the resolutions of the United Nations which are the sole basis of our operations in Korea. I shall quote the resolution that covers our action there. It is the resolution of June 27, 1950, and it has been accepted by more than fifty members of the United Nations. This is what it says:

The security council recommends that the members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.

That is our objective in Korea. Last week General Marshall repeated for his government this same objective when he said:

Our objective in Korea continues to be the defeat of aggression and the restoration of peace.

The hon. gentleman's leader this afternoon in the House of Commons said that it was the result of that decision, the decision of the United Nations relating to the specific action of the United Nations in Korea, which has resulted in Canada's participation in the efforts of the United Nations to preserve the freedom of Korea and deal with this act of naked aggression. That indeed is our objective in Korea. The hon. member would, I think, at least add, if not substitute for that, that our objective in Korea is the defeat of communism by armed force, because we are intervening with armed force in Korea. I say in all sincerity—and I know he will grant my sincerity in this matter—that there is an extremely dangerous confusion here, which should be cleared up, especially as it may be difficult to grasp the reasons for my statement, when Canadian troops are fighting Chinese communists in Korea, when other Canadian troops are being enlisted to stand on guard in western Europe against the threat from Russian communists, and when it is known that these various threats are inter-linked and are unleashed or held in check at the orders of the Kremlin.

I admit all that. But as I understand it, communism is a dogma, a type of society and a military danger—all three. The dogma has influenced the type of society which has been created in Russia, in other cominform countries and in China. The totalitarian nature of Soviet society has facilitated and perhaps even necessitated acts of aggression. But communism as a dogma, I repeat once

again, in my view, cannot be destroyed in Korea or elsewhere by military means. If we think it can, and if we think it should be attempted, we should have intervened in Czechoslovakia when the communists took over there. Such armed intervention at that time, however, or in Greece, or in connection with the Berlin blockade, could have and would have received no sanction of any kind from the United Nations. Communism as a dogma must be fought with other weapons and in other ways. But when its noxious doctrines, and when its perverted form of society takes arms and commits aggression against other peoples, then we must answer the communists with collective action including, when it can be made effective, collective military action; and that is what we are doing in Korea today.

What we are fighting in Korea and what we may have to fight in other parts of the world is what William Pitt the younger called "armed opinions", but armed opinions which have expressed themselves in armed aggression. I therefore hope that it will now be understood what I mean when I say that the United Nations' objective in Korea is not, by arms, to fight communism as an idea. Our objective there is to offer successful resistance to communist aggression and thereby to prevent, we hope, a third world war.

To conclude with the point that was raised by the hon. member for Vancouver-Quadra (Mr. Green), what can we do about the present situation in Korea? If we do not adopt additional measures, how can we ever hope to win? At the present time the advantages of two alternative methods are being urged. This is, indeed, the great debate. On the one hand it is said that total military victory is indispensable and that it can be achieved by permitting the bombing of China, by imposing a naval blockade and by employing nationalist Chinese forces outside Formosa. I do not want to repeat at this time why I believe that that policy would be a profound mistake—but I want to state my view that such a policy would not end the war in Korea at this time but might, on the contrary, lead from limited action to unlimited action, the result of which might bring in the U.S.S.R. If it did not, in my view it would almost certainly engulf us in a full continental war with 450 million Chinese people. I cannot myself think that that is the best way of ending the war in Korea. We would be playing for high stakes indeed if we took this kind of limited action in the hope that by such limited action we could end the war in Korea without going on if it did not succeed to unlimited action or without bringing in anyone else.