greatly. It was not a mistake to take measures to ensure the necessary security, on the basis of the information we had then, even though in the light of subsequent events some of the things that were done had been proven, as with every country, to be unnecessary.

## New Defence Concept

I referred a moment ago to the tremendous strength of the United States. In December it was publicly stated that the United States had now 200 nuclear-tipped, intercontinental ballistic missiles in place and that American missiles -- these were press reports -- now include 126 "Atlas" missiles, 54 "Titans" and 20 "Minutemen". In other words, they are moving in the direction of a new concept of defensive measures. Those new concepts were the result of the meeting in Nassau, to which I will later make reference.

No one can predict the future. We build today on the basis of information that we have. We provide the weapons today according to our best lights and following collaboration among those associated in this matter of defence. New forms of deterrent are being developed. Military mistakes and changes have been made by all the countries in the Western world. A short resume will give the committee some idea of how easy it is to say what should be done now on the basis of what was done earlier in the face of other circumstances.

Britain had the "Blue Streak", a long-range missile which cost her some \$267 million. She gave it up. Recently the United States decided that the "Skybolt" would not be used. ... What they decided was that in view of the uncertainty of this missile there was no real purpose in going on with it. But on the other hand, in Nassau the United States was willing to proceed, provided Britain would put up a corresponding amount of money in order to ascertain whether or not it could be made workable. By the spring of 1960 the United States had spent over \$3 billion on various forms of projects, military weapons and the like, that had to be cancelled or ended in their production.

Well, we took a stand in reference to the "Arrow". No one wanted to take that stand. ... As I look back on it, I think it was one of the decisions that was right. Here was an instrument beautiful in appearance, powerful, a tribute to Canadian production. But people sometimes say to me, "How would it have defended Canada?" What is the total area in which it would operate at full speed? The answer is, 325 miles out and back, in a vast country like Canada. We could not get sales for it at all and the cost would have been  $\$7\frac{1}{2}$  million per unit. What a tremendous cost to this nation. This instrument that was otherwise beautiful, magnificent in its concept, would have contributed little, in the changing order of things, to our national defence.

Every now and then some new white hope of rocketry goes into the scrap pile. We established the "Bomarc", the two units. They are effective over an area of only a few hundred miles. They are effective only against aircraft. People talk about change. Who would have thought three years ago that today the fear would be an attack with intercontinental missiles? This programme cost Canada some \$14 million. The United States put up the major portion of the total cost. I do not want to repeat, but it is necessary to do so, that with the advent more and more into intercontinental ballistic missiles the bomber carrier is less and less the threat that it was.