

- 2] Reinforce links with Washington: On the assumption that Canada's relations with the Union will continue to be multidimensional in their scope, it is in Canada's interests to reinforce links with Washington with respect to issues of mutual interest concerning the European Union. That is, Canada should seek to benefit from Washington's privileged access to the CFSP process. Admittedly, this will not be easy. The attempt by Canada to associate itself with the U.S.-Union Joint Declaration and Action Plan in a trilateral arrangement was rebuffed by both the Americans and the Europeans. The best that could be done was to conduct negotiations with the Union in parallel with those of the United States. Even this approach was thrown off course by the fisheries dispute, and the Canadian-Union agreements were not officially signed off until a year after those involving the United States. Nonetheless, there are structural and strategic matters of mutual interest, as well as shared commercial concerns, and an attempt to maintain a close liaison with Washington might have a multiplier effect on Canadian diplomacy.
- 3] Coalition building: There are aspects of the transatlantic relationship that are susceptible to coalition building between Ottawa and members of the European Union. There is a long tradition of Canadian policy seeking to counterbalance U.S. policies that are problematic for Canada by forming coalitions with like-minded European partners. The object, most of the time, has not been confrontation, but to associate Canada with a consensus that spans the Atlantic. This has been at the core of Canadian diplomacy in NATO and elements of the approach might be successful even in the very different political and institutional context of the EU. Here again, this requires a commitment and the resources to reinforce and build upon existing consultative mechanisms.
- 4] Exploitation of bilateral relationships: Given the ambiguous status of the CFSP within the Union structure, and given its limited ability to frame joint actions, the success of the above approach will depend on combining in a complementary fashion Canada's relations with Union institutions and authorities with Canada's bilateral relations with key European actors. Clearly, the relations with the Union, whether they concern the CFSP or anything else, cannot be a substitute for Canada's bilateral relations with its members. National capitals remain the decisive actors with respect to European foreign policy. The existence of the CFSP adds another dimension to Canadian-European relations and makes the management of these relations more complicated. This simply is a fact of life for Canada that can not be ignored.
- 5] Continued relevance of NATO: Though the least developed aspect of the CFSP, there are security and defence dimensions to it. The security dimension, so far, has been manifested only in the most general political terms, and the defence aspect is to all intents and purposes non-existent. Maastricht confirmed that the economic and technological dimensions of security should fall within the purview of the CFSP, but this of course provides an opening for the Commission to modify in practice article 223. Consequently, such restructuring of European defence industries as has taken place, and collaborative projects of various kinds have all taken place outside the framework of the Union. (Note that the European armaments Agency is a body created outside the Union.) Thus there are still opportunities in the area of defence-industrial collaboration to exploit alliance arrangements. Atlantic defence-industrial collaboration remains an option for Canada.