

to this end. Through a successful effort to stabilize East-West relations, the Soviets would expect gradually to deprive the "Atlanticists" of the opportunity to justify militant foreign and defense policies by referring to Moscow's behaviour. In order to reduce the perception of risk to the West that would inevitably arise with further movement toward détente and cooperation in Europe, Moscow would have to display a readiness to stabilize the military environment by taking steps toward agreement at the SALT and MBFR talks, presumably before the CSCE commenced. It would also have to convey that it was not seeking to oust the Americans from Europe, to disintegrate NATO or the EEC, or to establish an exclusive sphere of influence in Europe. Words would count for little here, and it would be necessary to signal Soviet intentions by exercising unilateral restraint and entering into agreements at some cost at least to its existing policies. At the same time, in order to prevent an escalation in Western negotiating demands, Moscow would have to avoid creating the impression it was caving in. Thus, the CSCE would not in itself bring about dramatic changes either in substantive Soviet policies or in the character of East-West relations. It would however mark an acceleration in a continuing process of transformation in East-West expectations concerning the probability of war and collaboration among adversaries.

In such a setting, liberal and anti-war elements of the