

introduce new intermediate range weapons in Europe, while at the same time pursuing arms reduction negotiations. It was in this context that Canada, despite considerable domestic pressure, undertook to negotiate an agreement allowing the testing of cruise missiles in our territory.

It is a sad reflection on the difficulties inherent in arms reductions that there had to be progress along the track which leads to the introduction of new weapons before movement could begin along the negotiating track.

Clearly, the key to achieving meaningful Soviet participation in arms reduction schemes will lie in demonstrating ways in which they will benefit them. What is needed is more than mere book keeping and auditing. We must also convince each other that our intentions are what we say they are.

This cannot be done by isolating ourselves or isolating the Soviets on every political, social and economic issue. We must speak to each other, not just occasionally, and not just between leaders. In short, we must recognize that the USSR is a Super-power; that it has strategic interests and the might to protect those interests. Only then will we be able to come to a mutual understanding about the desirability of arms reductions.