



"JUSTUM, ET TENACEM PROPOSITI VIRUM, NON CIVIUM ARDOR PRAVA JUBENTIUM, NON VULTUS INSTANTIS TYRANNI MENTE QUATIT SOLIDA."

VOLUME I.

PICTOU, N. S. WEDNESDAY MORNING, DEC'R 30, 1835.

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THE BEE

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PICTOU COUNTY TEMPERANCE CONVENTION.

NOTICE is hereby given, that a Convention for the District of Pictou, will be held at the West River, in the Rev. J. Ross's Church, on Wednesday the 30th instant at 11 o'clock, A. M., agreeable to a recommendation of the Eastern Convention, and the different Societies interested are requested to appoint Delegates to attend the same.

J. DAWSON, Secretary.

7th Dec 1835.

NOTICE.

THE subscriber having left this Province, has appointed Messrs. D. & T. McCULLOCH as his Agents, to whom all Accounts must be paid, they having power to grant discharges for the same.

JAMES MALCOLM.

Pictou, 7th December 1835.

NOTICE.

THERE is in possession of the subscriber, a lot of 8rd Irons, which were shipped on board the schooner *Pictou*, from Halifax. The owner will please call, and pay freight, and take delivery of his goods.

WILLIAM GRAHAM.

New Glasgow, Dec. 8th, 1835.

FINAL NOTICE.

ALL persons indebted to the Estate of the late WILLIAM MORTIMER, Esq., will please to take notice that unless they make immediate payment to the subscriber, legal proceedings will be instituted against them without distinction.

MARTIN J. WILKINS.

Nov. 4.

VALUABLE TRACT OF LAND FOR SALE.

TO be sold, by private contract, a valuable tract of Land, situate near the River of Ansgay, containing 150 Acres, more or less, 70 of which are under cultivation and fit for the plough. The capabilities of the soil, its situation being in so desirable a spot either for the farmer or the fisherman, being bounded by the gulf of St. Lawrence, are so well known that further description is unnecessary.

There is on the Premises a good comfortable DWELLING HOUSE and substantial BARN—it is well fenced, and abounds with firewood.

Terms, which will be easy, and other particulars will be made known on application to the subscriber on the premises.

WILLIAM GILLIES.

Arisaig, 23d Nov., 1835.

THE SOCIAL AFFECTIONS.

[An Essay delivered before the Literary Society, of this place, on the 16th inst. by G. A. BLANCHARD.]

THE two parts of which man consists, the body and the mind, are altogether different in their nature and qualities. The material part is naturally a dead, unintelligent mass; but the lamp which illuminates it, is an active intelligent existence, distinct from every thing else of which we can form a conception. Among the numerous qualities of matter, philosophers have mentioned its *inertia*, or incapacity of self-motion, and, accordingly, when the mind is separated from the body, that which was once all life and motion, is impotent as the dust on which we tread.

Power being a simple idea, does not admit of logical definition.—We know its existence and nature only by the effects which it produces.

The mind possesses two kinds of power, speculative and active. The former comprehends the intellectual faculties; the latter, the principles of the will. It is not by the powers of the understanding alone that we are distinguished from the inferior creatures. Our active principles partake of a more exalted character, assume a more laudable direction, and, notwithstanding the incitement of our appetites and passions, we can disregard their imperative calls to gratification, deliberately choose—and, like Scipio with the captive princess, act that worthy and honourable part which no inferior creature has the capacity even to discern.

In philosophical language, the term *action* refers to every voluntary exertion of the mind, and it is an effect originating in circumstances that excite our volitions, and determine the course of our conduct. The active powers form an essential part of our constitution, and are variously classed by philosophers. The indulgent Author of nature has given us all the principles that are necessary for our own preservation and comfort, and for the preservation and comfort of society, and if we permit them to assume an improper direction, we commit an irreparable injury to ourselves and do not fulfill the ends of our existence.

Our social principles are generally known by the designation of Affections or Passions. The former is certainly the more appropriate term; as the word *passion* is better adapted to the violent exhibition of all our active powers, than to the moderate exercise of any in particular. In common language the term *affection* seems to have acquired a specific meaning, being confined, in its application, to the benevolent feelings; but analogy warrants a more extensive signification—and it is justly applicable to all those active principles, which have persons for their object, and necessarily imply our being well or ill affected to some other animated being. In this essential property, they differ from the appetites and desires which have not persons, but things for their object.

Our affections include all those active powers that tend to the promotion of the happiness or misery of others, and therefore, may be considered as either Benevolent or Malevolent. They are thus distinguished, not because they are directly opposite in their nature—the one necessarily tending to the good, the other to the injury of our fellow beings—but because they possess distinguishing features which render a separate classification necessary. In this they

agree, that they are both exercised towards animate beings, susceptible of happiness and misery, and affected with pleasure or pain, by their operation.—In this, they differ, that they spring from a perception of distinctly opposite qualities in their object, and are attended by opposite sensations. Our benevolent affections are of various kinds, and their different operations depend on our various connexions with society.

Before Reason becomes the director of our volitions, we feel their influence, so that they cannot be said to originate in a rational regard for ourself or. As soon as the infant's lips are taught to whisper its parent's name, the smile that accompanies the half-uttered word, seems to say, "There is a magic in the sound." This is only the natural expression of filial feeling—the first benevolent affection that operates in the mind. The earlier efforts of nature are comparatively weak, but time and kindness give energy to the principle, till it acquires a very powerful ascendancy over our conduct.

The youth advances in life—his brothers and sisters grow up around him—he feels himself bound to them by an attachment coeval with his first recognition. The casualties of life may remove them to a distance; but imagination leaps over the intervening space, and the heart glows, with unabated regard, to these companions of his playful years. This is the operation of the Benevolent principle, called fraternal affection.

When arrived at the years of discretion, he begins to mingle more extensively in society. He sees around him beings who possess a congeniality of sentiment and feeling—kindred spirits; and with persons of this description, he forms a thousand attachments—the expressions of another Benevolent feeling, termed Friendship.

But at this period of life, he also becomes the subject of the tenderest and most governable of the social affections; which, from time immemorial, has been the song of the enthusiastic bard, but must not be excluded from the grave discussions of philosophy. This principle, which has been the occasion of so much joy and grief, and has often proved its imperial power in moulding the character and conduct, in strengthening or breaking the cords that bind us to earth—sometimes flowing, like a stream with a calm untroubled surface, and at other times, whirling us, like an irresistible torrent, through the vortices of life, in its violent paroxysms, most emphatically deserves the name of *Passion*, which, with much less judgment, has been applied to all the Benevolent affections. It is a feeling which, in the warm flights of fancy, the Poet represents as surviving death:—

"Hush'd were his Gertrude's lips, but still their bland
And beautiful expression seem'd to melt
With love that could not die; and still his hand
She presses to the heart no more that felt."

When this passion is restrained within the limits of reason, and meets with a suitable return, there is none of the Benevolent principles, that contribute more to domestic felicity; but, when fed by imagination, it is a flame in the young [and] susceptible heart, that burns brighter and higher, till it consumes the form, that contains it. A victory over this passion in its more violent form, is the greatest that man can attain.—

"Let conquerors boast
Their fields of fame—his, who in virtue dwells"