

The conscious-content (*i.e.*, the immediate experience of an experiencing individual) furnishes all the attainable data for the science. Of this experience—to be scientific—an absolutely impartial consideration must be given. For Psychology consciousness can be no existence or abstract form of mental life apart from all actual psychic facts. As Münsterberg says: "That which is immediately given in inner experience is neither a material world nor a soul, but simply consciousness, the consciousness of a definite content." We may define consciousness as the collective name of the mental processes which exist for an individual at any moment; in other words it is *all* of the conscious content at that moment—and nothing beyond this. The problem then of Psychology is the analysis of concrete mentality, in order to discover the ultimate elemental processes (analysis), and the laws of their combination into the concrete-complex of the mental life (synthesis). Such a procedure would deserve the name of Scientific.

Mental life, as a fact of observation, is given us only in constant connection with bodily life. Observation supported by experiment shows that the two maintain the most intimate relations to each other. It is agreed by all that the general physical condition of all mental states, which are data for Psychological Science, is the existence and the activity of the human nervous system. This relation of dependence is thought to be completely realized, although in great measure it can only be hypothetically maintained. It is inconceivable how a sensation can be derived from a motion (as one motion from another), and so for the most part at present, we speak of a "Parallelism" of the psychical (intellect, feeling, will) and brain process; *i.e.*, we conceive of

them as phenomena which accompany one another, of such a character that each change on the one side expresses itself in a corresponding change on the other. This principle of Psycho-physical parallelism would seem to furnish us with a regulative principle of scientific procedure in Psychology. We know, *e.g.*, that the sensation "blue" depends on the excitation of a definite sense-organ. Yet much at present must be presupposed, and in support of such a theory we can only await the increasing confirmation of experience.

In the developed human consciousness—which forms our only starting point—we discover the interplay of three categories of psychical fact or processes, which we name for the present: (1) Sensation (or Presentation and Representation—corresponding to the Intellectual faculty of the older Psychology); (2) Affection (Feeling—the generic fact of which agreeableness or disagreeableness are the forms); (3) Conation (Will, fact of effort or resolve). Thus we sense the red color of any object, we are pleasantly affected by it (the thrill of the entire organism) and conate the action of seizure. Many Psychologists deny the ultimate character of either one of these three constituent processes of consciousness; some attempting to derive affection and conation (*i.e.* Feeling and Will) from sensation; others attempt to derive all else from affection as the original of mind. Extremes in any case should for the present be avoided. The above division of mental processes only the increasing confirmation of experience can justify, or "inflexible" outstanding facts condemn. The conscious-content seems to be made up of these three ultimate processes, sensation, affection and conation, and whilst these three are one, sensation is not affection, nor affection, conation, nor conation sensation.