

received their instructions. The Brussels Permanent Commission met in London on December 30th and agreed that the governments should despatch instructions to Washington by tomorrow. I hope that the next stage will be fairly brief and that we shall be able to produce a complete text, except perhaps for the Preamble, before the end of next week. If we succeed in this, I shall hold myself in readiness to go to Ottawa so that I can be available when the text is considered by the Government.

Yours sincerely,

H.H. WRONG

P.S. Since I dictated this letter, you have spoken to me on the telephone about your discussion with the Prime Minister. In the light of this, we shall take a stiffer attitude than that suggested in the enclosure on the possibility of including North Africa and also on the membership of Italy. The enclosure is not meant for circulation to the other delegations. I am adding a supplementary note to it for the guidance of our own group.

H. W[RONG]

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Note de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis*

*Memorandum by Ambassador in United States*

TOP SECRET

Washington, January 3, 1949

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

COMMENTS ON REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP OF DEC. 24TH, 1948

*Pt. I. Questions of Scope and Procedure*

*A. Territorial Scope*

1. *Italy.* The arguments are impressive for the simultaneous association of Italy with the Treaty in some manner. There should be, however, conclusive evidence of a united view among members of the Italian Cabinet before we should consider inviting Italy to become a party to the Treaty, either as an original member or by accession. It is on the whole preferable that some method of simultaneous association of Italy with the Treaty, short of full participation, should be developed. The case for Italian association does not rest on the argument that Italy could make a positive contribution to the defences of the North Atlantic area, for Italy could not do so. The case rests on the importance of maintaining the Western orientation of Italian policy and preventing the extension of Soviet influence into Italian territory.

It is suggested, therefore, that a special arrangement with Italy would be the most satisfactory outcome. This arrangement might contain a statement by the parties to the Treaty that they regarded Italian security as essential to the security of the North Atlantic area, and that they intended on their part to pursue a policy of political, economic and cultural collaboration with Italy. It might go on to say that if a threat to Italian security were to develop the parties would immediately consult together *and with the Italian Government* on the action to be taken.