

preparations are made, or means demanded for commencing war. If the latter be the true hypothesis, the attempt to bully and intimidate England is, in my opinion, equally dangerous and dishonorable. An attempt which, even if it should in part succeed, will not be eventually serviceable to this country. It will injure our reputation—it has already done so—and may embarrass us in future negotiations with foreign states. In the mean time we run the risk of pushing Great Britain to such extremity that she may feel compelled, by a sense of honor, to regard for her reputation with the nations of Christendom, to resist by force our unreasonable claims. It is possible to calculate too securely on the pacific disposition of Sir Robert Peel and Lord Aberdeen and the British people.

Great Britain may probably, if we do not touch her on the point of honor, yield some portion of what she considers her just rights in treating with us, from the same motives that a respectable person will yield something of his just claims to a very litigious and unpleasant neighbor, in order that he may rid himself of annoyance. In such a transaction it is the successful party that is placed in the most humiliating position. If we pursue the course pursued by President Jackson in *violently* enforcing the treaty of indemnification of losses of American citizens, formed with the king of the French, and the course now pursued by President Polk, we shall soon acquire a character for obstinacy and grasping higgling diplomacy that will little conduce to gain us friends, if, on any occasion in the vicissitude of human affairs, we should need sympathy and friendship.

We may trace the course of this higgling overreaching diplomacy in a great measure to the fact that our negotiators are generally aspirants to the presidency, and that it appears to them that the best way to recommend themselves to the public is by driving a hard bargain with foreign states in all negotiations, whether about territory or about compensation for damages, &c. They are thus led in their transactions abroad to act rather on the principles of the crafty, chaffering small dealer, (the *perfidus caupo*,) than those of the man of honor, the gentleman. It must be admitted that the negotiators appear not to be altogether mistaken in their estimate of the road to popularity.

By this overreaching policy we may gain a few millions of dollars, or a few thousand miles of territory, worthless to ourselves and to every body else, and lose character and standing among the na-