

mit to them, he met the difficulties resulting from this multiplication of expence, by contriving a new security for new emissions of assignats.

For this purpose the system of terror was adopted in its fullest extent, merely as a measure of finance, in which view Robespierre undoubtedly considered it; and such was the success of his horrible proscriptions, that in some instances the very same estates have actually been three times confiscated and sold again. The assignats issued were but a sort of bills of exchange, drawn on the Revolutionary Tribunal, and paid by the Guillotine, which Robespierre is said to have called *an engine for coining money*.

In this way, as soon as the inferior and subaltern robbers of their country were grown rich enough to be worth plundering, the Guillotine transferred their wealth to the State, and furnished the security wanted for new emissions of assignats: this sanguinary contrivance had the desired effect on the infatuated multitude, who imagined that their value would not alter, at least in the interior of the Republic, as long as they could find any demagogues to load with riches one day, and to plunder on the next. It was by this terrible round of confiscations, dilapidations of public wealth, executions, and emissions of new paper, that the credit of the assignats was supported for more than a year, and the Republic was actually enabled to provision her fourteen armies at a cheaper rate, though with paper money, than the Allies could their forces with specie. To produce this political miracle, cost Robespierre nothing more than a declaration that half the property of France was to change its owners by violent means.

However, those who were thus enriched, not finding themselves at all more secure than those who were suffered to retain their property, began of course to unite with them for the destruction of a tyrant equally dangerous to both: almost a year elapsed before the