

into question. The following are among the most significant but are not intended to be an exhaustive list.

There is a requirement to take control of enemy commercial, fishing and scientific vessels found in Canadian waters on all three coasts at the outbreak of war. In the case of the Warsaw Pact nations, several hundred merchant and fishing vessels pass through Canadian waters each year. As Mr. Anderson stated: "... plans would envisage, as one of the early steps to be taken in an emergency situation, the rounding up of those Russian ... vessels so that they could be brought into our ports ... some of the fishing vessels are capable of being converted into mine layers or mine sweepers fairly easily ... most of the ... merchant vessels would be used more as support ships."²¹ In the event of hostilities, it would be important to deprive an enemy of these vessels, their cargos and the trained seamen manning them. They would also have to be kept from gathering intelligence or from more overt military uses, such as sowing mines or resupplying naval vessels. Enemy vessels would have to be ordered into Canadian ports, seized or sunk.

Possessing the ability to neutralize foreign naval vessels operating in support of limited economic, political and territorial objectives or violating Canadian coastal waters (as the sovereignty of Sweden and Norway was violated in recent incidents off their coasts) is another requirement. In the former case, the purpose would be to force the dispute into resolution by diplomatic means, by demonstrating that a *coup de main* would be met, or by persuading the potential enemy that use of force would entail high risk. MARCOM should also be given the specific task of denying enemy submarines and surface warships the use of Canadian waters in the event of hostilities. In brief,

The sub-committee finds that there is a requirement for Canada's maritime forces to be equipped to perform a sea-denial role in waters over which Canada claims jurisdiction.

Of the current list of NATO-oriented tasks, as noted earlier in this chapter, there are few that Canada's existing maritime forces could perform, given the high-threat environment which would exist. Certainly none that involves operations in northern European waters could be undertaken with confidence. Northern European waters are likely to be among the most dangerous in the world, given the current dispositions of the Soviet fleet and air forces. Having seen the damage that obsolescent Argentinian aircraft were able to inflict upon modern British frigates and destroyers, one cannot be highly optimistic about the probable fate of Canada's ancient surface vessels confronted by what the USSR can put into the air.

The new CPFs and the DDH-280s after their mid-life refits, might survive in such an environment; but they are years away. Nor are the Auroras equipped with the necessary defensive armament to operate in a high air-threat environment. Obviously, if Canada is to be of any use to its European allies these capabilities must be rapidly acquired. However, simple honesty would suggest that, in the interim, Canada should cease to commit its forces to tasks involving such an environment, or limit the areas in which they would perform them.

²¹ *Ibid*, 2 March, 1982, p. 22:22.