

focusing on the statement that a vote for this protocol is merely a vote for German rearmament. Such an over-simplification is grossly misleading. It is, indeed, the most insidious type of distortion, a fractional truth.

Communists themselves, as agents of Moscow, have so far abandoned intellectual integrity and simple honesty that it is futile to try to enlighten them by discussing their charges. But in this case their campaign unquestionably strikes some response in the hearts of many honest and sincere Canadian patriots, who have good reason to remember and fear the dread effect of German arms. It must therefore be objectively and exhaustively examined.

There are several significant features of the Paris agreements which we have to consider today. It is I think reasonable to expect that in the long run the most fundamental and durable of these features will be, first, the restoration of German freedom and sovereignty-- that is, freedom and sovereignty to the people of West Germany; second, acceptance of the voluntary adherence of these people to the western coalition. Those two features, as I see it, are fundamental.

The third feature of course is the provision that is being made for the Federal German Republic, in the exercise of the first right of sovereignty, to bear a fair share of the common burden of defence in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, through the Western European Union. In this connection I think hon. members would delude themselves if they conceived of the people of the German Federal Republic today as a nation of militarists straining at the leash for freedom to rearm, to tax themselves for weapons, and to conscript themselves for military service.

The fact is that in Germany, as elsewhere, there is revulsion against war and militarism from which Germans as well as the rest of us have suffered so much and so recently. In the Federal Republic of Germany today as elsewhere in free countries, rearmament, when it is supported -- and there is a strong body of opinion in Germany which does not support it, some from good motives and some from bad motives -- but where rearmament is supported in Germany today, as it is supported by the freely elected government of that country, it is generally regarded at best, as indeed it is here, as a tragic necessity.

In Germany as elsewhere moods and attitudes can change; but at present the situation is, I think, as I have described it. West German policies are of a kind which merit our support, and West German leadership is of a character that we should encourage. Indeed if that leadership had been in existence in Germany in 1914 and 1939 we would have avoided, I think, two world wars. Nothing, it seems to me, could be more calculated to discourage the development of healthy political forces in Germany; or to encourage a dangerous relapse into