

*a) Whether or not to impose sanctions*

The decision of whether or not to impose sanctions is a complex one, and will be influenced by a variety of factors pertaining to the character of the potential target, the objectives sought, and, crucially, the policies of other states.<sup>1</sup> Participants agreed, however, that this decision should be based on projections of effectiveness and humanitarian impact, and not on domestic political pressure.

Participants expressed enthusiasm for policies involving positive incentives (carrots) as complements or alternatives to sanctions, but they were pessimistic about the willingness of states to contribute to such initiatives, and wary of the implications of 'rewarding' objectionable behaviour. It was also noted that the constitution of the Security Council makes it ill-suited to the development of programmes of positive incentives and other initiatives aimed at pre-empting crises.

There was widespread agreement that the effectiveness of sanctions is often enhanced by an accompanying threat of force, as long as that threat is viewed as credible. Some participants suggested that, given the ineffectiveness and humanitarian consequences of long-term economic sanctions, the use of force is sometimes preferable to such measures.

*b) Type of sanctions used*

Participants stressed that senders must closely examine the structure of the target state, its economy, and its society, and design measures with a clear understanding of *who* they are intended to influence, and *how* the sanctions will cause these actors to feel pressure to change their policies.

It was also noted that travel bans, visa denials, and sporting and cultural sanctions have tremendous symbolic importance and psychological impact, and have been undervalued as means of influencing target elites.

Finally, participants supported the use of appropriate targeted sanctions against elites in most circumstances. However, they cautioned that targeted sanctions alone are unlikely to prove effective as coercive measures: they can often be evaded, and in most cases, are not painful enough to cause entrenched target elites to alter their behaviour. Targeted sanctions are most effective when combined with other measures, such as the threat of force.

*c) Canada and the Security Council*

In order to maximize Canada's influence over a given sanctions debate, participants agreed that four conditions must be met. First, Canada requires timely political and military intelligence and high-level connections to relevant parties. Second, in order to facilitate a swift response (thereby

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<sup>1</sup> For a discussion of these factors, see Barry Burciul, "United Nations Sanctions: Policy Options for Canada," (DFAIT, 1998.)