months ahead when conditions might be a little bit different".

He added: "I admit that we are still far short of the achievement of a peaceful solution of the Korean question. It is an intensely difficult problem and we shall need a large fund of patience if an acceptable solution is to be attained; but there is still hope that such a solution will eventually be attained. Meanwhile I feel - and it is no unimportant result if I am correct in this feeling - that after the Geneva discussions the renewal of hostilities in Korea is much less likely than it might have been before that Conference opened."

Dealing with the Indo-Chinese side of the Geneva Conference, Mr. Pearson said:

"I believe it is too early to predict whether a negotiated settlement can or cannot be reached on honourable terms which would bring an effective end to the hostilities, provide a basis for a workable political settlement, recognizing the interests of the indigenous peoples of the countries concerned, and which would be a wise move in the direction of creating positions of stability in the Southeast Asia area. So long as negotiations are still going on, however, I think it would be unwise and indeed unnecessary for me to speculate on the result of the failure to end the war. Nevertheless whether success or failure results, the problem of general security in Southeast Asia remains.

SEARCH FOR SECURITY

"As I see it, the solution to that problem depends largely on whether the countries most immediately involved can agree on the objectives and principles that should underlie any collective arrangement to maintain and strengthen security in that area. I hope I may be pardoned if I put forward, on the basis of my own association with this problem in recent weeks, some considerations which in my view affect the search for security in Southeast Asia.

"In the first place, I think we must accept the fact that the international communist conspiracy is working for, and has made progress in, securing control of Southeast Asia. We should certainly be aware of the danger to international peace and security in this development, a danger which cannot be exorcised by comforting interpretations of Asian Communism as merely agrarian reform or as Nationalism painted red.

"It is true, I think, that the urge for national freedom and for social and economic reform, and not devotion to Communism as such, is the mainspring of the greatest revolution of our time, the emergence of the masses of Asia from colonial control, feudal restrictions and western pressures. But communist Imperialism, directed from Moscow or from Peking or poth, has been too successful in exploiting, and in some cases in capturing these forces, even though Communism as the agent of aggressive and reactionary Imperialism cannot bring either freedom or progress to those it envelopes. We know that but there are millions of destitute and despairing people in Asia who do not as yet.

"In the second place we should, I think accept the fact that if this danger exists, and I think it does, there can be no objection to, indeed there should be approval of, regional collective security arrangements organized to meet those dangers in the right way, by those immediately concerned, under article 51 of the United Nations Charter. We cannot support the principle of collective security in one part of the world and reject it in another. I think it is right and important that the United States of America should be reassured by its friends on this question of principle. Nevertheless, we should also recognize that in practice the type of collective security arrangements suitable for the Atlantic area might not be practicad or desirable in Southeast Asia.

REGIONAL SOLUTION

"An understanding of these needs and these differences will assist, indeed I think will be essential, in finding the right regional solution to the problem of security in that part of the world, once it is agreed that such a solution is necessary to supplement and make more binding the general application of the United Nations Charter. Any such regional solution, I think, might well embody the following principles:

"First, arrangements reached must be consistent with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. If they could be associated in some form with the United Nations, so much the better.

"Secondly, they must be divorced from anything that could be called Colonialism and not designed to maintain regimes, colonial or national, that have little or no popular support.

"Thirdly, it should be recognized that the problem cannot be dealt with effectively in military terms alone, and that no mere military agreement is likely to be satisfactory or enduring. Indeed military aggression of the conventional sort is not likely to be the main danger so much as communist Imperialism exploiting those forces within the state - and not always unworthy forces - in order to bring about subversion, civil war and the forcible installation of communist regimes.

"It should also be recognized that, as President Eisenhower said on May 12, no country can be saved from Communism unless it wants to be saved.

"Then, fourth, as I see it, any solution must not be, or susceptible to the interpretation as being, a purely 'western' one, or one