

IX Opportunities for Synergies

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Introduction

Many multilateral agreements and activities form the foundation of international security, including those that reduce or limit arms; constrain proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and destabilizing accumulations of conventional weapons; build confidence and trust; prevent, dampen and help resolve regional or local conflicts; and enforce sanctions, arms limitations, or disarmament imposed under resolutions of the UN Security Council. While the processes associated with these agreements and activities—arms control verification, confidence-building measures and peace operations—may take place in separate venues, the linkages among the processes can, if properly utilized, enhance their benefits individually and collectively.

In support of international security, arms control verification, confidence-building measures and peace operations require certain common actions: they seek to verify compliance, resolve ambiguous activities or events, and deter or possibly detect non-compliance. These actions take place whether the operational context is a formal arms control agreement such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, a regional non-proliferation agreement such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, an approach to confidence-building such as the Open Skies Treaty, or one of the many efforts involving UN personnel for the purposes of prevention, containment or resolution of an interstate or intrastate conflict, for example, the peacekeeping force in the former Yugoslavia. The ultimate goal of the three processes is to reduce the likelihood of armed conflict or reduce its severity if it happens.

The Methods and Activities Associated with Arms Control Verification, Confidence-Building Measures and Peace Operations

A number of methods and/or activities have been developed to assist in the implementation of arms control verification, confidence-building measures and peace operations.

Arms Control Verification

From a notional perspective, monitoring arms control agreements is primarily a function of intelligence collection and analysis, using all information available concerning a particular activity or location. In certain developed countries, this function is mainly accomplished by NTM, which includes reconnaissance satellite systems using photographic, infrared, radar and electronic sensors; ground-, air- and sea-based radars and other sensors; seismographs; communications collection stations; and underwater acoustic systems.

Countries that do not have NTM or access to data collected by NTM rely on their NIM, which includes the sum of the country's intelligence collection and analysis capabilities minus the technical systems described above which these countries do not possess. NIM is concentrated in the area of HUMINT, the collection by human sources, and the analyses of open-source information such as media coverage or commercial satellite photography. Countries that lack NTM and have minimal NIM capabilities must rely on international authorities or other countries to do the monitoring for them.

NTM and/or NIM are complemented by *co-operative measures*, which include data exchanges, notifications, on-site inspections and aerial inspections. Comprehensive sets of information covering the numbers and locations of treaty-limited equipment (TLE) or treaty-limited items (TLIs), technical characteristics, site diagrams, and information regarding force structure and location are among the items shared during *data exchanges*. *Notifications* include advance information on planned activities, movements of TLE/TLIs, changes in number of TLE/TLIs, planned changes in personnel or existing units, conversion or elimination of TLE/TLIs, and requested or planned on-site inspections. There are four general types of *on-site* or *on-the-ground inspections*: pre-agreement trial inspections, routine or short-notice inspections of declared facilities, challenge inspections

