

(Mr. Hansen, United States)

These actions now being taken by the Soviet Union were taken in 1969 by the United States on a unilateral basis. One need not be well schooled in mathematics to figure out how much agent the Soviet Union could have produced in the 18 or so years which have elapsed since the United States last produced chemical agents. It is also clear that recently manufactured chemical weapons would be technologically more advanced than those produced approximately 20 years ago.

These are some of the considerations which have led the United States Government to reach the decision to modernize its own chemical weapons capability.

Nevertheless, the United States remains committed to reaching an agreement which would lead to the destruction of all the world's chemical warfare capability, ridding humanity of the scourge of these horrible weapons for all time. Such a convention would require agreement on the type of effective verification régime which would both deter violations and provide confidence that commitments freely undertaken were being complied with.

There now appears to be wider recognition in the Conference that effective verification means that doubts about a State's compliance with an agreement must be dealt with through on-site inspection. No one questions that, in the case of allegations of use and doubts about declared locations and facilities, challenge inspections would result in an on-site inspection. There is also movement toward acceptance of similar provisions for making on-site inspection of undeclared production facilities mandatory when a challenge inspection request is made. These are, in the view of my delegation, positive developments which we will study carefully.

In recent days, some discussion has taken place about the utility of alternative measures in dealing with challenge inspections related to undeclared stocks. My delegation has asked how any measure short of entering a bunker could provide assurance that the bunker did not contain chemical munitions. On 16 April, Ambassador Nazarkin attempted to provide an answer. My delegation will of course study the ideas he presented. Nevertheless, air sampling would show that the devices being used did not detect chemicals in the air -- nothing more. Moreover, I would note that the external configuration of a facility may help to define the possible uses of that facility, but it does not define the internal contents. In addition, I would like to observe that storage facilities for chemical weapons stocks in the United States do not always have "ventilation systems, special sewerage and air filtering and waste water treatment installations", of which Ambassador Nazarkin spoke. When he visits our facility in Utah we will be able to demonstrate this fact. All of this leads back to the basic fact that observation of a facility from outside provides no assurance that it does not contain chemical weapons. In a political sense, it seems clear that denying entry completely to the bunker would result in an assumption that it actually contains forbidden materials.

My delegation is not opposed to consideration of alternative measures within the time period allowed before an actual inspection is to commence. Our study and analysis, however, has not led us to discover any suitable