

questions in a forthcoming study of the Cuban missile and Soviet-American crisis arising out of the 1973 Middle East War. The origins and dynamics of both crises are analyzed within the broader framework of general deterrence, as understood and practised by both superpowers. We then examine the ways in which the lessons of the crises, as interpreted by Soviet and American policymakers, subsequently influenced their practice of general deterrence. Our study indicates serious limitations to both kinds of deterrence and suggests that they are related in ways that are quite contrary to the predictions of deterrence theory.¹⁵⁴

DETERRENCE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Immediate deterrence attempts to prevent a specified challenge. General deterrence must do more than merely "buy time" by preventing challenges; it must also help to transform a conflict so that the defender's need to rely on deterrence diminishes.¹⁵⁵ Proponents of deterrence routinely claim that deterrence can and does contribute to conflict resolution but no empirical studies substantiate these claims.¹⁵⁶

To test the long-term effects of deterrence, it is necessary first to identify conflicts in which deterrence has been practised that have been resolved or "cooled down" to the point where the defenders' perceptions of the likelihood of future military challenges have diminished considerably, if not altogether disappeared.¹⁵⁷ Possible cases might include Anglo-American and Anglo-French relations in the second half of the nineteenth century and Israeli-Egyptian, Sino-American, and Soviet-American relations in the post-1945 period. All

¹⁵⁴ Lebow and Stein, *Who Is the Enemy?*

¹⁵⁵ This point is made by George and Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy*, p.5.

¹⁵⁶ Some of these claims are critically evaluated in Lebow and Stein, "Beyond Deterrence," pp.29-33.

¹⁵⁷ A satisfactory analysis would then compare the results of the analysis of these kinds of cases against cases over time where general deterrence was practised but the conflict continues, and cases where a conflict was ameliorated in the absence of general deterrence.