

"As for the Commission becoming involved in the investigation of actual border incidents which may constitute a threat to the security of the country, the Canadian Delegation considers that the Commission is competent to deal with frontier violations only when it is the Democratic Republic of Vietnam forces which violate the borders, then the Commission could not investigate unless there was some evidence that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam were involved. In cases involving other forces, it is only if the Cambodian authorities actually decided to establish foreign military bases (assuming for the sake of argument that the Commission is obliged to determine whether a threat to the security of the country existed), that the Commission would have to assess whether a threat existed to Cambodian territory which justified the establishment of foreign military bases.

"Furthermore the Canadian Delegation considers that the greatest assurance against any apprehensive interpretation of Article 7 lies in the definition of Cambodian neutrality as proposed by Prince Sihanouk and adopted by the Sangkum Congress,

"According to points 2 and 4 of that definition:

"(2) Cambodia abstains from any military or ideological alliance with foreign countries;

.... "but (4) in the event that it suffers foreign aggression, it reserves the right:

(a) to defend itself by arms;

(b) to call upon the United Nations;

(c) to call upon a friendly power."

"Thus apart from jurisdictional considerations, the Canadian Delegation does not consider that minor border incidents are in any way compatible with the term "suffers foreign aggression" as used by Prince Sihanouk. Also Prince Sihanouk is careful to reserve the right to take action only after Cambodia "suffers aggression."

"Article 13(a) stipulates that the Commission shall in particular:

"control the withdrawal of foreign forces in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities and see that frontiers are respected."

"The Canadian Delegation believes that this clause must be read as a whole and in conjunction with Article 4(1), and that it is meant to refer only to the paramount question of the withdrawal of foreign forces as defined in Article 4(1). We have little doubt that it is intended to mean that the Commission should see that the frontiers are respected in connection with the withdrawal operations. Article 13 deals with the general duties of the Commission and in three paragraphs it specifically mentions three of the more important tasks of the Commission which are really at the core of the Cease-Fire Agreement. It is unlikely that when referring to the particular task of supervising the withdrawal of foreign forces, paragraph (a) would also refer to a general supervision of the frontiers. The basic responsibilities of the