

teresting and instructive, and seems to me worth many volumes of the French school which has succeeded him.

The Germans have added nothing to the literature of Sensationalism which is too much opposed to their mystical tendencies ever to have secured any portion of their favour.

Let me now endeavour to explain the connection of the Sensationalist doctrine with Locke's philosophy, which you must be aware does not directly favour it. Locke rejected innate ideas, maintained that the first and the simplest mental states are sensations, and that from them as materials, the mind forms all its other states. The question arises, and may appear not to have been satisfactorily answered by Locke himself, *how* these other states, by him called ideas of reflection, are formed. We all recognise certain remnant copies or revivals of sensations recurring singly or in clusters, as the case may be, differing sufficiently from the actual sensations, yet irresistibly referred to them, as specially connected with them, and implying their previous existence. The inquirer asks, do these, variously combining together according to natural laws, produce all possible mental states; or are they altered by an action upon them of certain faculties inherent in the mind; or again, are they so altered and acted upon after being united with other states necessarily existing, though only made perceptible by such union and which thus constitute an equivalent of the supposed innate ideas? I know not that any other supposition than these three is possible in connection with Mr. Locke's primary principles. The latter must be adopted by the pure idealist if he at all followed out Mr. Locke's course of thought or admitted the first principles. The second was probably Locke's own view, but could not be sustained, if the first and simple supposition explains all the phenomena, or if the alleged faculties are shown by analysis to be mere cases of a general law. The first supposition is that adopted by the Sensationalist, who maintains that assuming only the uniform operation of certain very simple laws derived from a wide induction and shown to have at least a probable connection with the physical cause of sensations, he can show how all possible mental states, intellectual and emotional must arise from sensations and their revivals above referred to. He offers proof that what are described by writers of other schools as distinct faculties of mind are only cases of the results of the great laws, not at all requiring any supposition of distinct powers, and he undertakes to exhibit the composition and gradual formation of those very ideas,