

An Hour with the Editor

VANISHED CIVILIZATIONS

Lake Titicaca lies on the borders of Peru and Bolivia at an altitude of upwards of 12,000 feet. It has an area of about 4,000 square miles, but was formerly larger. It is decreasing steadily in size. A lake of such a size at such an elevation is rather a notable thing, but the chief interest in it is due to the ancient ruins on an island and of yet greater ruins on the shore. In and around these ruins many excavations have been made with the result that numerous articles have been brought to light indicating a high degree of skill on the part of those who made them. They are of gold, silver or copper, and there is evidence that the people who manufactured them had discovered the uses of tin and of quicksilver. While no instruments of iron have yet been discovered, the fact that a word for iron has come down in the Peruvian dialects from a very ancient time, as well as the nature of some of the work in stone, seem to establish that the use of this metal was common.

Some confusion exists in the minds of many people concerning early Peruvian history. Most of us have heard of the Incas and the remarkable empire over which they ruled before the Spaniards came. This was a very notable nation. Its territories embraced nearly all the west coast of South America and extended indefinitely into the interior. Its people were peaceful and they had utilized the country in ways which their white successors have never rivalled. The mountain sides were terraced and irrigated, so that vegetation varying in character from the products of the tropics to those of the temperate zones were produced in abundance. Across the mountains remarkable roads were built, and many great buildings testify to their achievements in architecture. It is popularly supposed that to the Incas is to be attributed the origin of the ancient civilization of Peru; but this is an error. There is not much doubt about the duration of the rule of the Incas. It probably did not extend back much further than the date of the Norman conquest of England and the early Spanish invaders of the country have preserved abundant evidence that the Incas did not profess themselves to know the origin of the buildings around Lake Titicaca and elsewhere or of the vessels of gold, silver and other metals or the pottery found in gravel banks. The civilization of the Incas appears to have succeeded a period of barbarism of unknown duration, and beyond that period there seems to have been an era of quite a different civilization. While it is recognized that there is much to be learned about the Incas, all authorities agree that the relics above referred to tell of a past so ancient that not even a tradition has been preserved concerning it.

The character of this ancient workmanship indicates a high degree of skill. The buildings are made of stone, which has been carefully quarried and the architecture is of a type peculiar to the country. For instance, the doorways are all made wider at the base than at the top. The use of lime or cement was not universal, some of the buildings being of blocks of stone so accurately cut and laid that although they were simply placed upon one upon the other, they have stood firmly for uncounted centuries. This style of building may represent a yet older civilization than to which the cemented structures are due. Speaking of these great stone edifices the writer of the article on Peru in the Encyclopaedia Britannica says their character suggests that they were undertaken by a powerful monarch with unlimited labor at his command, which he desired to keep employed for political reasons, probably because the people were a subject race. Indeed when we seek to explain the existence in Peru and elsewhere in South America of these ancient works of human hands we are confronted with a field wherein our imagination may take the wildest range without getting beyond the realm of possibility, or for that matter of even exceeding the limit of the very probable.

There seems to be no escape from the conclusion that a period of very high civilization existed in South America at a period far beyond the range of history and even of tradition. It is hard to realize that probably centuries before the ancestors of the modern civilized nations emerged from barbarism, people existed who had made great progress in art and science, and who after enjoying a term of prosperity perhaps centuries long have vanished so completely that no one can hope to show that even their remotest descendants survive. We go to one of our great cities and look upon the wonderful creations of modern skill as exhibited in edifices, in railways, aqueducts and the like. It seems hardly possible that one day these things may perish and that men from other lands should ever wander among the few remains of them and wonder what manner of people we were to whom they owed their origin. It seems impossible that our civilization can ever vanish, that the names of our nations can ever die, that the fame of these wonderful years shall become just a tradition, then a myth and then disappear utterly. But the ancient monument of Peru shows that this is quite within the range of possibility. Vast structures of stone imply the availability of abundant labor, appliances for handling materials, architectural skill in building and settled social conditions. Vessels made of various metals, some of them such as called for a knowledge of the smelting of ores, imply both art and science.

Uniformity of character in buildings and moveable articles implies long established custom. A huge structure of great stones built according to well established architectural plans and containing skilfully wrought vessels of gold implies a high and ancient civilization, different perhaps in character from that of our day, but nevertheless in some respects not inferior to it.

Now reflect that when some four centuries ago there went to Peru an invading force which found the country in possession of a people in some respects cultured and undoubtedly the descendants of a race of invaders who had taken possession of the land about five centuries before. Reflect upon the fact that these cultured people themselves did not claim to be aboriginal, but admitted that before they came the country had for an indefinite period been the scene of barbarism. Then reflect that before that period of barbarism a people had occupied the land who understood the mining and working of metals, the quarrying of stone, the transportation of vast blocks for great distances, the erection of mammoth buildings, the art of road-making and all the other avocations associated with these things, a people who had developed an efficient system of government, in short who represented in themselves many centuries of progress. When you have thought of these things and then realized that the memory of the latter is absolutely lost, you will begin to realize how very little we know of the past history of the human race and with how little certainty we can forecast its future.

THE EVOLUTION OF KINGSHIP

People from all corners of the earth are gathering in London to participate in or to witness the coronation of the King. It is not derogatory to His Majesty to say that personally he has done nothing to entitle him to such honor. He himself would be as ready as the most extreme republican to admit this. Indeed no man could possibly deserve such honor, no matter what his ability or achievements might be. Many other kings, as well as sovereigns holding what are thought to be higher titles have been crowned, but never in history has any one been invested with the insignia of kingship with such splendor and popular demonstration as will attend the coming Coronation. What does it mean? How did this very remarkable thing happen to become possible? The British people are the most democratic in the world; yet next month will witness what may almost be called the apotheosis of kingship at the hands of this democratic nation.

Kingship as represented in the person of George V. is the result of a large process of evolution. Undoubtedly the long and auspicious reign of Queen Victoria surrounded the throne with and its occupant with an indefinable dignity to which the personality of the sovereign, the greatness of the nation and the underlying spirit of British institutions contributed their respective shares. Doubtless also the qualities exhibited by Edward VII. in his all too brief reign accentuated the esteem in which the monarchy is held by the people. Unquestionably the present king displays characteristics which seem to show that the royal office will lose nothing in prestige or in popular estimation while he continues to fill it. But these considerations do not touch the foundation of the matter. They do not afford an answer to the question: What does British kingship represent?

Perhaps if we briefly trace the development of the kingly office we may be able to discover an explanation of what seems on its face like an anachronism and to be inconsistent with British idea of freedom and equality. We are not concerned with kingship as it has been developed in other countries. Most of the other royal institutions are modern in comparison with ours. They represent the result of the personal triumph of some individual who in comparatively recent years was able to gather into his own hands power over his neighbors. A robber chieftain came down out of the mountains, laid waste the lowlands, called himself by some lofty title, was strong enough to secure recognition of it from neighboring potentates, became a duke, which means a leader, and gradually grew strong enough to call himself a king and even an emperor. Such is the origin of most European royalities. But with the British kingship it is different. If we would seek for its origin we cannot hope to find it, for it is lost far back in the mists of prehistoric days. We know that among our Teutonic ancestors there were kings, and that they were chosen by the people; but we do not know when this office was first established. That it existed during the whole period of Roman imperialism is beyond question, and it must have existed long before the Caesars. Our ancestors did not acknowledge any man as their lord; they chose a leader, who derived his authority from the popular voice. Custom seems for centuries to have confined the popular choice to a certain family, so that while the practice of election and the recognition of hereditary right existed side by side, it was the former and not the latter that gave sanction to royal authority. The fundamental idea of kingship as it is found in the race from which we are sprung, is that the people select one of their number to represent them all. In later times the popular choice became limited in its exercise to a portion only of the community; but the essential feature

of the royal office was that its incumbent was only "primus inter pares," that is the first among equals. If the King is more than this today the added lustre of the office is due to the democracy and not to the nobility, which for centuries refused to concede that the King was anything more than one of themselves, who for expediency was conceded a position of supremacy.

When William the Conqueror took the English crown he deemed it wise to recognize the Saxon principle of election, and it was not long before the Norman kings found it advisable to recognize also the Saxon idea of a reigning family, and by intermarriage with a daughter of this ancient house to unite its blood with its own. The Norman and Angevin kings did not, however, concede the representative character of the monarchy. They were imbued with the Continental idea of the kingly office, namely, that it was purely personal, instead of being as it was held to be in Saxon days, a trusteeship for the people. As the years passed the limited character of the office began to be better recognized, and in the time of Edward I. it had come to be admitted that, whatever might be the rights of the sovereign personally, he held his powers in trust for the nation at large. The wars with France and the War of the Roses interrupted the development of the kingship, or to speak more correctly, delayed its restoration to its ancient significance. With the Tudors there came in a reaction towards autocracy, but it became weakened during the reign of Elizabeth, who though autocratic in her personal views, deemed it wise to subordinate her wishes to those of the great minds by whom she was surrounded. The Stuarts brought with them from Scotland views of monarchy that were more in keeping with the Continental idea than with that which existed in England, and the endeavor to force them upon the people cost Charles I. his crown and his head. From that day to the present the trend of kingship has been towards the Saxon conception of it. There have been occasional slight reactions. James II. attempted to restore the Continental idea which his Stuart ancestry entertained, only to have it cost him and his descendants forever all right to the crown.

And so it has come about through the evolution of a thousand years that the kingly office has been restored to what it formerly was. The ancient idea of equality has been restored; the king is once more primus inter pares; the office is once more a trusteeship; the Crown is the symbol of the nation. We have not an autocracy, not even a monarchy in the old sense of the terms; but what Tennyson called a crowned democracy. If the splendor of the office has been magnified, it is because what it stands for has grown in splendor with the years.

For what, then, does British kingship stand? It stands for the might of the British people, which is not the mightiness of armed force, nor even of vast territorial extent, nor is it due to the fact and the person in whom it is vested is chief among almost uncounted millions of people; but it is the might that has its origin in freedom. British kingship is the personification of British freedom.

THE OBJECT OF PHILOSOPHY

Immanuel Kant defined the object of philosophy to be to ascertain: "What can I know? What ought I to do? What may I hope? Very few of us have time to read the works of this great philosopher, and not many of us are capable of catching his meaning at all times. To appreciate a fundamental philosophical analysis a mind trained in metaphysical distinctions is essential. But every one can appreciate the above statement of the object of philosophy, and each of us can, within our personal limitations, attain it. Do not make the very common mistake of supposing that philosophy is something very abstruse, difficult of comprehension and only of theoretical value. Professor Ferrier defines philosophy as "reasoned truth," that is a thing that has been established philosophically must be established by reason. In a narrow view of the term this would exclude what can be established by reason plus experiment on the one hand and by reason plus faith on the other; that is, it would exclude what we now call science and religion, and this indeed is the idea held by most modern so-called philosophers. But it is not in this light that it will be regarded in this article, but rather in the ancient aspect that Pythagoras, the founder of the philosophical school, regarded it, namely, as the whole realm of human knowledge. And it seems as if this must be the view to take of it, if we would seek in any useful measure to answer Kant's questions.

What can I know? If we ponder this question a little, we will be surprised to find out how very little we actually do know, and within what narrow limits our knowledge must necessarily be confined. We cannot hope to know the origin and fundamental nature of matter; the origin and fundamental nature of force; the origin and fundamental nature of reason. Experiment and observation alone cannot teach us these things. Reason may suggest explanations of them, but it leaves us uncertain. It may lead up to what seems an absolutely necessary inference, but we must bear in mind that in the argument from the known to the unknown we are restricted to things which are alike in their nature. We cannot, for example, argue from what is known in music to what is unknown in electricity. We may,

from what we know about the motions of the visible planets, assume the existence of an invisible planet, because the same laws apply to the known and the unknown; but when we attempt to infer from the existence of visible and invisible planets the origin of that out of which planets are formed, we are foredoomed to failure, because we are then entering into a new domain, where our reasoning powers have nothing to guide them. We are as mariners upon an unknown sea, without a compass and without the stars. Hence we must remain ignorant of the profoundest and the fundamental entities of creation, namely the Cause and the ultimate nature of the visible universe. We do not help the case any by saying that the Cause was God, for this is only to give it a name, not to explain it. God is and must forever remain unexplainable. The writer of the Book of Job realized this when he asked: "Canst thou by searching find out God?"

But on this side of this impassable limit to human investigation, there is a field of useful research so wide as to be practically illimitable, and it is to this field that the question of Kant applies. To seek to know what is knowable is philosophy. To give these observations a practical turn, the question, "What can I know?" is one that ought to have a place in our everyday life and in every sphere of human activity. If we undertake anything, our effort ought to be to ascertain what we can know about it, and this is as true of growing flowers, or cooking a dinner as it is of applied electricity. A feature of modern civilization is specialization. We educate ourselves within narrow limits. In the mechanical arts men specialize in certain things. Take the printing trade as an example. Time was when a printer was expected to know something about every department of that trade, but this is passing away. With the introduction of the linotype, greater results have been made possible by the same expenditure of labor, but the time is near when a man may be a perfect machine operator, and yet be unable to "set" an advertisement by hand. Every trade is being specialized. Men grow up accustomed to do just one thing, and that is very often something that would be absolutely valueless of itself. They become so many cogs in a great machine. Hence it seems as if there never was a time when the question, "What can I know?" was of more practical value to the everyday life of ordinary men and women. In other words, the fundamental question of philosophy might well be adopted as the rule of ordinary life.

Stories of the Classics

(N. de Bertrand Lagimod)

PERICLES AND ASPASIA

"So that now," writes Plutarch, "all schism and division being at an end, and the city brought to evenness and unity, he got all Athens and all affairs that pertained to the Athenians into his hands, their tributes, their armies, and their galleys, the islands, the sea, and their wide-extended power, partly over Greeks and partly over barbarians, and all that empire, which they possessed, founded and fortified upon subject nations and royal friendships and alliances."

Now Aspasia was a barbarian, a native of Miletus, and daughter of Ariochus. But she possessed besides remarkable beauty of form and feature, mental endowments far above the ordinary. In her young girlhood she had heard tales of Thargelia, that courtesan of old Ionian times, who had become so famous during the period of the Persian wars. She came bringing all her Greek suitors, and they were many, by her arts and blandishments, over to the Persian interests, and these same suitors being men of the greatest wealth and power, she "sowed the seeds of the Median faction up and down to several cities." Her imagination fired by these tales, Aspasia was eager to emulate her predecessor, and having come to Athens, she set diligently to work to perfect herself in her many accomplishments, that she might prove a magnet of such fine intelligence as to attract the greatest intellects of the day.

Being both sagacious and charming, her presence in the great city was immediately felt. Socrates himself used often to visit her, and the most influential Athenians were eager to consult with her and to bring their wives to hear her learned discussions, in spite of the fact that her house was a rendezvous for courtesans and their followers. But when we read facts like this last one, we must bear in mind that at that time in Athens the lot of good women was a particularly hard one. Happily today we know very little comparatively of what it is to be tempted to do wrong, for there is every inducement to be virtuous; but in Greece two thousand years ago, there were so pitifully few inducements to a woman to remain single-minded and pure, that there is all the more honor to those who kept themselves uncontaminated, and the less call for harsh judgment upon those who followed the path of least resistance.

In the course of time, Pericles himself was induced to visit this remarkable, gifted woman. He went unwillingly at first, for the course of events kept him from following the bent of his inclinations. Athens was still divided, and Thucydides still held the balance of power.

It was her beauty naturally that first attracted the great leader. He was content to

sit and watch her, until he heard her discourse, and then her keen insight, her logic, her depth of knowledge so impressed him that he felt he must possess her aid and favor before he could make a success of his undertakings.

Pericles had a wife, who had been a near relation, and by her he had had two sons; Zanthippus and Paralus, but the marriage had been wholly unhappy. There had been no love on either side. So when Pericles' passion for Aspasia was made known to her, his wife was glad to agree to a divorce, for she had long ago given her heart to a friend of Pericles, and it was to this friend that Pericles now gave herself.

The Athenian law made marriage with a barbarian illegal and impossible, but Aspasia became his wife without benefit of license, and the union was singularly happy, whether deservedly so or not. From this time dates the greatest Pericles' successes, and that he sincerely loved this woman there can be no doubt, for all historians agree that he was faithful to her until death, Plutarch telling us naively that "he loved her with a wonderful affection; every day, both as he went out and as he came in from the market place, he saluted and kissed her."

As to whether or not she was the instigator of the Samian and Peloponnesian wars there is some doubt, though her enemies did not scruple to lay this charge against her. But until his death Pericles was swayed, if not governed entirely, by her counsel. So great was her influence that at last ill-feeling was stirred up against her, and she was finally indicted of impiety, on account, supposedly, of her teachings. She was not without company in this, for Socrates was indicted on a like charge, though with much less justice. And her punishment was in no way to be compared with his, for he was compelled to drink the hemlock, while she, when the judges were about to condemn her, was set free through the pleadings of Pericles. He took the stand in her behalf, and, shaken with emotion, the tears gushing from his eyes, he spoke so eloquently in her defence that he gained her pardon.

Pericles procured the passage of a law whereby the children of irregular marriages were legitimate, and when his sons by his first wife died, his son by Aspasia was permitted to assume his father's name.

Pericles died of the plague, which in the same year of his death carried off thousands in Greece. As for Aspasia, chronicles tell us little further in regard to her. There is a story to the effect that she went to live with one Lysicles, but as Lysicles was killed in battle the year following Pericles' death, the story is probably not true, and may be another concoction of the woman's enemies. Having been closely attendant upon Pericles during his illness, the probabilities are that she, too, died of this disease. History does not mention her again.

EFFECT OF THE DAY

Amanegg, the well known actor, received a ring as a present from an admirer. Showing it to a friend of his, he said the unexpectedness of the gift reminded him of an open-air amateur performance of "As You Like It," that he once rehearsed.

"The rehearsal," he said, "took place in a garden that was overlooked by a building operation. As my amateurs postured and chanted the bard's beautiful lines, bricklayers above us laid bricks, carpenters planed boards and masons chipped stones."

"And one afternoon, during a silent pause in our rehearsal, we heard a voice from the building operation say gravely:

"I prithee, malapert, pass me yonder brick."

A STONE'S THROW

"The ancient Romans had a catapult that could hurl rocks more than a mile."

"Now I understand it."

"What?"

"My landlord told me this house was a stone's throw from the depot. He must have had it on his hands since the time of the Caesars."—Cleveland Leader.

CLEVERNESS AND CUNNING

Cleverness and cunning are incompatible. I never saw them united. The latter is the resource of the weak and is only natural to them. Children and fools are always cunning, but clever people never.—Byron.

A smart commercial traveler, calling upon his best customer, was very disappointed to learn that he had purchased all the silk required for the season. At the man's request, a sample was shown him.

"Ah!" he exclaimed. "You say you bought this at—?" mentioning a price. "Why, sir, I could have sold you the same identical same, for sixpence a yard cheaper!"

The customer smiled. "Then send me on a credit note for the difference," he rejoined. "It should amount to about forty pounds. I bought the silk from your house last week by letter!"

"Would you marry for money?" asked one girl of another.

"Not I; I want brains!" was the reply.

"Yes, I should think so," said the first speaker, "if you don't want to marry for money!"