it can ever exercise an independent control over legislation and check the excesses of the Party majority in the Lower House few of its advocates, we presume, would seriously maintain. Here is a fine opportunity for it, if it has really any independent authority. Never did a Party majority commit a more manifest excess than the Party majority in the Commons is now committing by putting the appointment of all the revising barristers, not into the hands of the judges, as British precedent and constitutional right enjoin, but into the hands of the Party Chief. No impartial man has any doubt as to the character of that proposal. What will the Senate do? It will register the edict of the Minister, by whom four-fifths of its members have been appointed, and who still exercises over many of them the influence of patronage, while they have no constituencies to keep them upright or to punish them if they fall.

We give an extract from Canon Farrar's vehement and eloquent reply to Baron Bramwell's defence of liquor. The Baron was rather brusque, but the Canon misses the point. The question is not whether we think fermented liquors wholesome or unwholesome, but whether coercive legislation is wise and just. There are many things the wholesomeness of which is questionable, or which may even be deemed certainly unwholesome, yet to which nobody would dream it either wise or just that coercive legislation should be applied. Excess and error are not confined to drink. In the same number of the *Fortnightly* in which Canon Farrar's reply appears, there is an article on Diet by Sir W. Thompson, who avows his conviction that more mischief in the form of actual disease, of impaired vigour, and of shortened life, accrues to civilized men from erroneous habits in eating than from the habitual use of alcoholic liquors, great as he deems that to be. "I am not sure," he adds, "that a similar comparison might not be made between the respective influences of those agencies in regard of moral evil also." Yet neither he nor any other man in his senses would propose to pass an Act of Parliament regulating diet. Milk, among other things, Sir W. Thompson pronounces to be, in the case of all but infants, altogether superfluous and mostly mischievous as a drink. Particularly noxious he considers it to be when taken as a beverage with meat. If he is right, and milk produces dyspepsia, we may be sure that it also produces ill-temper, and thus disturbs the peace of families. Are we, then, to pass a law prohibiting the drinking of milk and affixing special penalties to the drinking of milk after eating beef? Is not everybody in this case content to leave the matter to the teachings of individual experience combined with those of medical science? If, as Canon Farrar avows, the total abstainer finds in his abstinence greater pleasures than the drinker of wine finds in his glass, and at the same time feels that he gains infinitely in wealth, respectability and comfort, surely he can make this apparent to his fellows and induce them to follow his example. Nature has framed her law against intemperance and she inflicts the penalty with perfect certainty and rigorous justice on high and low alike. Canon Farrar abjures the doctrine that drinking wine is in itself wicked, and says that those who argue against it are fighting a chimera. "For myself," he says, "I can only say that during nine years of total abstinence I have never so much as told young persons in confirmation classes, or even children in my own national schools, that it is their *duty* to abstain; and as for morally condemning millions of wise and virtuous men who are not abstainers, I know no total abstainer who would not heartily despise himself if he could be guilty of a judgment so wholly unwarrantable." The Canon speaks of the Prohibitionists whom he knows; there are some whom he does not know, and for whom, perhaps, he would not be so ready to answer. He writes very magnanimously about the duty of sacrificing private rights to the public good. But then, in the first place, we ought to be sure that it is really the public good; and, in the second place, we ought to be sure that we are ready to sacrifice our own rights as well as those of others. Would Canon Farrar be quite as ready to sacrifice his own tea as he is to sacrifice the labouring man's beer? He says that he has been a total abstainer for nine years. But, in all that time, has not the Canon once received the sacrament? The first introduction of wine in Scripture, he says, is connected with the fall of a patriarch. One of the last introductions of wine in Scripture is the institution of the Eucharist.

It cannot be too often repeated that the question is not whether drunkenness is sinful and ruinous, which nobody doubts, nor whether wine is wholesome, but whether coercive legislation is wise and just? If, indeed, wine or beer were literally poison, it would be necessary and right to suppress the sale. But who believes that wine or beer is literally poison, either to body or to mind? Certainly not Canon Farrar, since he admits that they are drunk by millions who not only continue alive, but remain wise and virtuous. Whole nations drink the so-called poison daily without feeling themselves the worse for it. Regular wine-drinkers often live to patriarchal ages. We could ourselves mention some who have reached their hundredth year. Cornaro, the famous dietist and centenarian, drank the light wine of his country. Mr. Gladstone is an illustrious proof of the truth of the opinion pronounced the other day by Dr. Andrew Clark that a glass of wine at the principal meal hurts no man in body, mind or spirit. The man who governs England and leads the House of Commons at seventy-six with unimpaired, it might almost seem with ever-increasing, vigour drinks wine, as is well-known, every day with his dinner; and, as we may venture to say that he has never been guilty of excess in his life, he is also a disproof of the preposterous assertion that temperate use must lead to abuse. The finger of reprobation is always pointed by Prohibitionists at England as the great beer-drinking country; but, if beer is the beverage of a nation which in almost every line of greatness leads the world, it seems to follow, however scandalous to the Prohibitionist the inference may be, that there is no great harm in drinking beer. The English navvy, who always drinks beer, can do a harder day's work than any other man in the world. What people really mean when they say that wine or beer is poison is only that in their judgment it is unwholesome, just as in the opinion of many are tobacco, green tea and pastry. They speak, in short, figuratively, and penal legislation cannot be based on figures of speech. After all, ought we not in this as in other questions of diet to make allowance for differences of climate, individual temperament and occupation? The preachers and the ladies who are the most earnest workers in favour of Prohibition, being sedentary in their habits and not using much bodily exertion, are naturally drinkers of tea. Is not the navvy, the miner or the stevedore just as naturally a drinker of beer?

People hardly know what there is in the Scott Act. If they will look into it carefully they will find such provisions as nothing could justify but the persuasion that Canada was given over to drunkenness and sinking into a gulf of perdition. Bent upon securing convictions at any cost of what they have lashed themselves into regarding as the most heinous of all offences, its framers set at naught the first principles of justice. The 89th clause directly violates the fundamental maxim of British law that no man shall be compelled to criminate himself. It gives, it is true, a formal protection against the use of evidence extorted from the accused in any criminal proceeding which may be taken against him; but no formal protection can prevent the evidence from becoming known and producing its inevitable effect on the mind of the jury or the tribunal whatever it may be. Even this subterfuge is cast aside and the face of iniquity is openly disclosed in Clause 122, which enables the Magistrate to put to the accused the question whether he has been previously convicted, and, if he confesses that he has, "to sentence him accordingly." In the previous clause, which defines the evidence necessary for conviction, there is a subversion of fundamental principles still more flagrant. It is there enacted that in any prosecution for the sale or barter of liquor "it shall not be necessary that any witness should depose directly to the precise description of the liquor sold or bartered or the precise consideration therefor, or to the fact of the sale or other disposal having taken place with his participation or to his own personal and certain knowledge, but the Justices or Magistrates or other officer trying the case, so soon as it appears to them or him that the circumstances in evidence sufficiently establish the infraction of law complained of, shall put the defendant on his defence, and in default of his rebuttal of such evidence shall convict him accordingly." The witness, who be it remembered may be a professional informer, is not to be required to depose to the facts as of his personal or certain knowledge; any hearsay which satisfies the mind of a country Justice, perhaps a violent Scott Act man, is enough; the guilt of the accused is then to be presumed, and unless he can rebut what the framers of the Act are pleased to call the evidence, he is to be convicted and sent to gaol. Let the crime against which the Act was directed be what it might, supposing it were the most dangerous of all offences, instead of that of selling or bartering a glass of ale, every citizen who cherishes those rules which are the only securities for personal liberty and safeguards of innocence would be bound to vote against such a measure. If breaches of principle are allowed in one case they may be allowed in all; and to the plea that there is a strong motive for obtaining convictions at any cost in the case of liquor-selling, the answer is that it is seldom without a strong motive that gross injustice is committed. But it is not only on the principles of justice that the Scott Act tramples: it tramples also on the laws of domestic affection. Its 123rd clause impels the husband to give evidence against the wife and the wife against the husband. After this, what would their wedlock be? We have the greatest respect for the Methodist Church, which is believed by its authority to supply the chief motive power of the