

population, when some favourite piece has been performed, the actor is solicited to enact it again, so the Free Church actor who once tells it, is sometimes requested to "give again the story of the minister who stole the silver spoons!" I need not say what a proof we have here that from the charity which rejoiceth not in iniquity, our Free Church visitants seem to be unhappily free. The principle of this class of cases, of which Stewarton and Cambusnethan are instances, is this. The courts of the Church of Scotland have not only to decide on properly spiritual matters, but also on such secular matters as the Churches, Mansees, and Glebes—and when a sentence of deposition has once been pronounced by a church court on any minister on account of his having by such court been found guilty of any spiritual offence: deemed worthy of such punishment, the stipend or salary which he previously had ceases to be paid to him. Now, in 1834, [the very same year that the Veto Law was enacted, the Assembly of the Church of Scotland made a law regarding certain churches which were before that time called Chapels of Ease, and in one of which I was for a time a minister,—which law said that the ministers of those chapels, to be called henceforth Quoad Sacra churches, should sit, deliberate, and vote in all the courts of the church on all matters that might come before them, whether these matters might affect the sacred or the secular interests of the church. In the case of Cambusnethan, the case from which the favourite illustration about the thief is drawn—the minister of the parish was about to be deposed on proved charges of a very heinous character—and the minister, on the ground that there sat in the court which was about to pronounce judgment against him an individual who had no right to occupy a place in it as one of his judges—that, in fact, the court was vitiated by his admission according to the ancient principles of the constitution of the Church of Scotland, as well as in the eye of the law, applied to the civil court for an interdict to prevent the church court from pronouncing that sentence on the ground set forth in the application made for the interdict by the accused and convicted party. And what is the effect of such interdict? It is merely to stop further procedure in that case, until this question shall be tried, whether the Quoad Sacra minister, objected to, ought or ought not, according to the ancient constitution of the Church of Scotland, and according to certain statutes and regulations of the kingdom grounded on that constitution, to have a seat, as a judge in a church court, when that court is about to pronounce a sentence which must have not merely sacred but secular bearings and consequences.