

I know so much of it as inclines me to believe that your Ministers may permit an Inlargement of the popular Power without any Danger to the Crown. And therefore must still suppose, that the most effectual Means to prevent the Designs of *France* on your domestic Tranquillity, is to content your People. And should I say, that it would be the most effectual too to reduce the present Power of that ambitious, designing Crown, I don't think I should be much mistaken.

The Nature of your Constitution admits of more Freedom than ours; and by Consequence, you may indulge your People with less Danger than we can. This leads me almost necessarily to consider a Point which I have always understood differently from most of those I have argued with of your Country. It is this; that tho' both you and we are free, yet your Freedom is greater and more extensive than ours, and that by reason of your Constitution. For the Foundation of such as yours, a limited Monarchy, being firmer and broader than a Democracy; there is therefore less Danger of its being subverted. I mention this only to shew, that I would not advise the giving your People Satisfaction in their present Demands, supposing them not unreasonable, unless I thought it might be done with Safety to the Government.

And now, Sir, after we have examined *France* in her Strength and Weakness, how
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