

contending with the general of the army of Canada for the first magistracy. Marius and Sylla—Cæsar and Pompey. Perhaps so. But suppose things not so bad; that our generals, in place of rending their country by arms, submit in war and after war to the forms of election—take office from the hands of the people. Is a military ascendancy less inevitable? Have not our people, as in all the popular States of which history gives us any record, already instructed us in the catastrophe? Will they have any other than military men in high office—with the spirit of command, and contempt of civil control, which defines the real and eminent military man? If this were to be a war, then, as it had been said it would be, between the republican and monarchical principles, the conflict would be at home—among ourselves; and the first were certain to succumb, and the last to be triumphant. He (Mr. A.) had heard the suggestion that, under the severe pressure of the distress in the continuance of this war, the Union might give way—break up. He did not concur in this apprehension. War raging, till honorable termination had been reached, our people would never sunder. But the case was different entirely when, in the restoration of peace, a military dynasty, in the forms of our republican institutions, would supervene. Then the heart of the patriot would be turned to disruption, the impulse at once of incontrollable feeling, and the dictate of invaluable duty.

Such (Mr. A. said) were some of the consequences—they were only a part—which might come, which he believed in his inmost heart, to a great extent, would come, from this war proposed for Oregon, if it occurred. What were to be the compensations, independently of these ulterior considerations, for the ordinary sacrifices in blood and expenditure which the war would involve? Not Oregon. That was too small a thing to think of. Still less a part of Oregon, or the use of a river, (the Columbia,) with a hundred and twenty-five miles of available stream, and fifteen miles of nearly impracticable and absolutely irremovable shoal at the mouth of it. The compensations were to be the occupation of the English territorial possessions in our neighborhood. Well, suppose these occupied, as probably, not certainly, they would be in the progress of the war—what were we to do with them on the restoration of peace, supposing (what was impossible) that we were not to restore them as the indispensable conditions of peace? Retain them as parts of our Confederacy? That would be the signal for the dissolution of the Confederacy, which would break to pieces, too, in no long time, under the weight, even if this were not to prove the signal of dissolution. And was it certain that these provinces would be willing to come into our Confederacy? They had been fostered in attachment to monarchical as we to republican institutions. Were we to force their inclinations, put our institutions on them as a yoke? That would, indeed, be the policy of a part of our people, but not, it must be presumed, of the majority. Were we to restore these possessions? Then, where was to be the compensation for all the enormous cost in blood and treasure of the acquirement? Was it to go in satisfaction for that worthless part of Oregon—the only part that England was not ready to surrender to us to-day? Or were we to establish these British provinces, if we did not wish to take them, or they did not wish to come to us, as an independent republican confederacy? Then the cost of suffering and blood of our people would go to their establishment, as a great neighbor, and therefore rival, in place of a foreign Power.