life, but with this obligation, like that of the ox or the ass, transferable at pleasure, and at his master's death reverting not to himself but to his master's heir.

And such is precisely—not perhaps "according to Judge Ruffin, of North Carolina," but according to the written constitution and laws of the Southern States—the present position of the American slave. His legal description and his legal *status* alike are those of a "person held to service."* It is to his service alone—the precise right so expressly reserved by S. Paul to Philemon, that the master has any claim. And though that service may be transferred from master to master, and *in respect of that service* he is in the eyes of the law a "chattel personal,"† in all other respects he is regarded as a "person" and not as a "thing," and as a person his rights and immunities are guarded by jealous and stringent laws. His service differs from that of an English apprentice in two respects. It is perpetual and it is transferable. In all others it is identically the same.

I pass from the examination of the arguments you have adduced, to consider one or two which seem hitherto to have escaped your attention.

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* *Vide* note on p. 11.

† There are few points on which more misunderstanding prevails, than in respect of this phrase. Its meaning is simply that the obligation of service—in respect of which alone the slave is a "chattel," as the wife also is sometimes called a "chattel" in respect of hers—follows the law, not of "real," but of "personal" estate.