

not be regimenting or controlling individual nations, but, by agreement, would be framing courses of action designed to serve the general interest. It would be one of the functions of the general assembly and of the economic and social council to coordinate the activities of these bodies, to prevent overlapping of activities, and to fill in gaps where joint action proves to be desirable.

I have now completed a summary outline of the proposals to come before the San Francisco conference. Let me mention some of the difficulties and objections which are certain to present themselves in any consideration of the proposals.

In considering the proposals as a whole it is important to have constantly in mind that the international organization should be so constituted that it will function as effectively as possible. It is no less important for us, that in whatever is agreed to, the interests of Canada should be safeguarded. It is also most desirable that the organization, as finally established, should command the assent of the people of Canada so that, over the years, its underlying principles will secure steady public support. It may be that no fundamental changes will be needed to safeguard our interests. But that is not to say that the proposals could not and should not be improved.

Let me first refer to the position which would be accorded to the great powers. I have already mentioned that the participation of the great powers in the enforcement of peace is imperative, and that the main task of maintaining peace must rest with them. The five permanent members of the security council would be given the special voting rights I have described. If responsibility is to be fairly matched with power, it is essential that the great powers should have permanent membership in the security council. Incidentally, permanent membership was given to the great powers in the council of the league of nations.

Objections are certain to be raised to the special voting rights proposed for the great powers. There can be no question that they are open to theoretical objection. To what degree they are open to practical objection depends upon how far objection can be taken to a recognition of the fact of "power" in this imperfect world. It would not be realistic to expect to establish immediately an international system strong enough to coerce any great military power bent on attaining its aims by force. In the proposed new organization, all its members, great and small, would be bound to "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any

manner inconsistent with the purposes of the organization." If this solemn promise were broken by a great power the world would be faced once more with a situation like that presented by German aggression in 1914, and again in 1939. Such a situation could not be met in any international body merely by an arrangement of voting, however theoretically perfect. It is not a question so much of what is perfect as of what is possible. No charter can give the world security if, among the powerful, there be not the will for security.

Furthermore it should not be assumed that the possession by the permanent members of the security council of an individual veto on the application of penalties would make the security organization impotent in the event of a breach of the principles of the charter by one of the great powers. Penalties are the last resort. Before they were applied, there would have to be full discussion of the merits of the dispute. If, by its voting procedure, the council were blocked in proposing a solution, the general assembly could make its own recommendations by a two-thirds majority of its members. The great power concerned would know where, in the eyes of the world, justice lay, and the risks such a power would incur in violating the charter.

To expect perfection in any plan would be utopian. Both Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt have stated that while the proposals are not perfect, they are in substance the best upon which, up to the present, it has been found possible to secure agreement. President Roosevelt has said he expects that, over the years, the charter will be amended from time to time in the light of experience.

The decision with regard to voting taken at Yalta represents an achievement of substantial unity by the three greatest powers. It would be unrealistic and unwise to reject the decision outright. Here, if anywhere, there is reason to keep an open mind, and to reserve judgment as to our position until all points of view have been explored at the conference.

In general, exception can hardly be taken to the extension, within the organization, of some special prerogatives to the great powers, on whom the major responsibility for keeping the peace must rest. That is a correct application of the functional idea to international organization, which is that the position accorded to a state should correspond with the functions which it is able and ready to discharge. In marshalling force against aggression, the position of those able to contribute the greatest force must be respected.