

doubt in cold logic that this approach is the only approach. Human beings en masse, however, rarely set their course on points of cold and sane logic and while I am convinced of the fact that the Finns for the most part have managed to do this, it will take some thought and study thoroughly to appreciate why and how it has been possible.

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8. Finnish policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union has on the political side one principal and simple objective – to continue to persuade the Russians to leave them alone. For the moment it is succeeding fairly well. Of strictly political relations between the two countries it can be said that there are practically none. Officials of the Foreign Office rarely see or have any contact with officers of the Soviet Legation. The Foreign Minister very occasionally has general talks with the Soviet Minister. I believe that the Foreign Office has had two protests only from the Soviet Legation in the past year both concerning the arrests of drunken officers in Helsinki. Partly, at least, as a result of these two incidents Soviet officers or men are never seen on the streets of the capital, nor, I believe, of any other city.

9. Pravda and Isvestia rant and rave about the “fascist, criminal and reactionary” Fagerholm Government. The Finnish communist press parrots along with them. But the Kremlin appears to do nothing, at least publicly and officially, to support the “persecuted” communists in Finland.

10. Relations between the two countries exist therefore almost exclusively in the commercial and reparations fields, for each of which there is a special Soviet delegation in Helsinki having no connection, as far as is known, with each other or with their Legation. The usual reply to the usual question in the Commercial Division of the Foreign Office is “Oh yes, we get along all right with them, but (deep sigh) it takes a lot of patience”. On these commercial and reparations questions I intend to report separately (but possibly not until after my next visit to Helsinki) and I shall not therefore discuss them in detail in this despatch.

11. One revealing remark was made to me by a prominent Finnish business man à propos the policy of “continuing to persuade the Russians to leave us alone”. In answer to a question from this gentleman I described our recent oil, gas and iron ore developments in Canada. He observed that these were very very exciting discoveries indeed which in time would undoubtedly change the whole face of Canadian economy, but, he added, “God forbid that we should ever make similar discoveries in Finland. We sometimes feel that what resources we have already are perhaps too attractive!”

### **Domestic Political Situation**

12. It is too soon for me to write with any authority or in any detail on this matter. My talks with various people from the President down were, in the circumstances, of a very general nature. The one obvious question, of course, I asked wherever an opportunity arose – what is the strength of the communist party and how has it been affected by the outcome of the recent strikes? In so far as the first part of the question is concerned the general – and expected – view is that the party is not weak and is, in itself and apart from its foreign loyalties, a very definite force to be taken into account. As for the second half of the question I was surprised, in my limited opportunity to “sample” (in the gallopien sense of the word) to find widely divergent views. Of the two extremes, one was expressed by Mr. Hämäläinen, Chief Government Labour Mediator, who was not convinced that the communists had lost anything through the comparative “failure” of the strikes. His view was based, however, on some assumptions which, as he himself said, may or may not be correct. One is that because of the number (7) and importance of the unions expelled from the Central