

Security Council Resolution 687 on the destruction of Iraq's nuclear potential, which sets a precedent in the area of non-proliferation, should be applied in full. Second, the Security Council, in consultation with IAEA, should keep records of all high-tech exports to the above-mentioned countries. These should be maintained until these countries agree to subject their nuclear programmes to full guarantees or sign the NPT. Third, border controls should be strengthened and funding should be increased for intelligence services interested in nuclear proliferation. The Security Council should be entitled to send a team of inspectors into any country suspected of conducting nuclear activities. If the activities are not stopped, international sanctions should be applied. Fourth, China should be induced, through economic pressure if necessary, to observe the LNC guidelines on nuclear transactions.

At the same time, however, exporters of nuclear materials should be careful not to push restrictions on technology transfers too far for fear of compromising all North-South cooperation.

Paul Leventhal, the president of the Nuclear Control Institute, asked whether it was worthwhile trying to fill the gaps in the nuclear export control system. It was in fact very difficult, he said, to persuade exporters to agree to any extension of export control measures. In addition, since the restrictions also covered large numbers of dual-purpose products, there was a danger of alienating poor countries which wanted technology transfers. Finally, the efforts undertaken to limit exports did not stop clandestine nuclear weapons programmes.

Almost all large suppliers had concluded shady transactions from the point of view of non-proliferation. West Germany had authorized numerous sales of dangerous products, despite diplomatic efforts undertaken by the United States and Great Britain in this regard. France, the USSR and China had concluded many transactions not subject to safeguard procedures with potential proliferators. Even the United States was guilty. In particular, it sold certain products to India until 1976 and, for political reasons, turned a blind eye to the nuclear activities of China and Pakistan.