Peace In Our Time?

cal and genuine economic and technical cooperation, together with open political and cultural channels to Eastern Europe are probably the most effective weapons the West can deploy against new dangers or a reversion to the old confrontation. The West cannot and should not be expected to lower its defenses unilaterally wherever a plausible threatening capability remains arrayed against it. By the same token, however, it would be a mistake of monumental historic proportions to miss or delay any opportunity, in this unprecedented climate of promise.

The West should reciprocate and encourage every realistic disarmament measure. Western failure to do so, or to innovate wherever possible in this climate could at some point provide a dangerous pretext to those in the East who resist improved East-West relations. Similarly, those in the West whose values, prejudices or interests may lead them to drag their feet cannot be allowed to slow the overall Western response in seizing these historic opportunities for positive change. As early as January 1990, a new window for progress may be opened with the NATO/Warsaw Pact discussions on military doctrine which, if they go well, could lead to negotiations on mutually acceptable restructuring of the forces, on both sides, for "defensive defence."

The Qualitative Race: Modernization Goes On

There are other dangers that have not yet been touched by the welcome prospect of major East-West disarmament measures, and they need to be confronted quickly and squarely, with Canada playing its part as required. With substantial cuts coming in the accumulations of conventional arms in the European region, it is obvious that the military planners and negotiators on both sides will still be seeking to maintain the most modern equipment permissible under the new quantitative limits. There will be a process of "culling" older and more ineffective equipment and still a very strong competitive impetus to modernize the remaining arms. Up to a certain point, arms control negotiators may even share a tacit professional interest in permitting this process. When it is recognized that each successive generation of weaponry in recent times has tended to multiply the destructive force of its predecessor, the potential for further *qualitative* arms races is amply clear.

The challenge of trying to put some cap on weapons modernization has not yet been seriously introduced, in spite of all the improvement in the general climate, and Canada has a significant and legitimate interest in pursuing the question. Some of the major