

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Protocol of 1925 and is aimed at legalizing the production of those chemicals which, as we all well remember, were widely used by the United States in Viet Nam.

We support the position expressed on this subject by Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Argentina, Viet Nam and some other States and believe that the convention we are discussing should absolutely ban the use of herbicides for military purposes. Regardless of the eventual decision on the relationship of the convention with the Geneva Protocol of 1925, the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques and other international agreements, such a ban on the use of herbicides would introduce utmost clarity and would therefore be very useful. Naturally, the future convention should also ban the use of irritants in armed and other conflicts. As to the possible use of irritants for "riot control", which includes suppression of peaceful public rallies (demonstrations, meetings, etc.) the Soviet side believes that such a provision would be far-fetched, incompatible with the dignity of people and tending towards human rights violations.

I would also mention that from our study of the proposed United States definition of chemical weapons we have been unable to understand the United States position on incapacitants, namely, whether their use for law enforcement should or should not be banned.

I should also like to point out the following. In the context of permitted activities, the United States draft convention focuses entirely on the relatively small quantities of supertoxic lethal chemicals that could, under the future convention, be produced or retained by the parties for protective purposes. At the same time the draft actually ignores the same chemicals, regardless of their quantity, once they are officially intended for peaceful purposes. Production of such chemicals is permitted at all commercial enterprises, with no restrictions whatsoever on the number of such enterprises or on the transfers of such chemicals. The proposed quantitative limitations are also unclear. This approach provides a basis for any State, should it choose to violate the convention, to produce the most dangerous of the prohibited chemicals in any amounts it might need.

And finally, I will touch upon one more issue which the Soviet delegation gave special attention to in its last statement on chemical weapons. I am referring to the tasks and functions of the Consultative Committee to be established under the future convention. As we have already emphasized, we attach great importance to formulating the provisions on the organization and functioning of such a Committee. In order to facilitate further negotiations on this issue, a group of socialist countries intends to submit to the Conference a working paper devoted to the organization and functioning of the Consultative Committee. We hope that the working paper of the socialist countries will be taken as a basis for the solution of this issue.

These are our views on a number of important issues relating to the future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons; they stem from the desire of the Soviet delegation to make progress in resolving the problems concerning the prohibition and abolition of those weapons.