

model; it guaranteed that it would provide Vietnam with the products to which it did not have easy access and thereby strengthened its own political and military influence over the country. Here again the increase in economic assistance only came after the decisive events of 1978 and 1979.

In June and July 1981 several economic agreements were signed in Moscow. Soviet aid rose to US \$2 billion per year (forty percent in the military sector and sixty percent for the economy in general).⁵⁸ On 19 June a very important agreement was signed dealing with the production of offshore gas and oil; mines, electricity, transport and indeed all the vital sectors of Vietnam's economy have benefitted from Soviet economic aid. The July agreements, which set up the third Five Year Plan (1981-1985) involved aid valued at US \$6.525 billion. This figure is based on a Soviet calculation, according to which the aid for that period was 350 percent greater than that for the period 1975-1980.⁵⁹

On 31 October 1983, under the terms of the new accords, the Vietnamese agreed to increase their production of tropical fruits, vegetables, coffee, tea, tobacco and rubber in order to meet Soviet demands. It thus became very difficult for Vietnam to alter the type or destination of its exports once these structures were put in place. It is worth noting that whereas in 1980, Vietnamese trade with the Soviet Bloc amounted to seventy-seven percent of its trade, by 1983 this had risen to ninety percent.⁶⁰

These few facts, which are examined in great detail in various other studies,⁶¹ are evidence of a takeover and indicative of the important role

⁵⁸ Martial Dassé, "Le Vietnam dans la 3e guerre d'Indochine," *Défense nationale*, vol. 40 Paris, November 1984, page 115.

⁵⁹ See the article by Vo Nhan Tri, "Soviet-Vietnamese Economic Co-operation since 1975," in *Indochina Report*, no. 8, Singapore, October 1986, pp. 38-71.

⁶⁰ Leszek Buszynski, *op.cit.*, page 186.

⁶¹ Among the articles on this subject the following are worth consulting "Le Vietnam dix ans après: bilan et perspectives," *Problèmes politiques et sociaux*, 7 mars 1986; La Documentation française, Paris; Vo Nhan Tri, "Vietnam: The Third Five Year Plan 1981-1985. Performance and Limits," *Indochina Report*, no. 4, Singapore, October-December 1985. On the deployment of Soviet military at Cam Ranh Bay and Danang, see the very good brief account in the *Asia Yearbook 1983*, Hong Kong: F.E.E.R., pages 22-26.