

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

The reactor contains relatively small amounts of short-lived radioactivity and would only contribute modestly to the total dose rate during the first week after the detonation. However, the amounts of the more long-lived compounds are very substantial in the reactor and after only one week the radioactivity that emanates from the burnt-out reactor would overshadow the radioactivity of the bomb itself.

If a one-megaton bomb is detonated, the area affected by a radiation dose exceeding 100 rads would be some 2,000 square kilometres. If the same bomb hits a nuclear reactor of 1,000 megawatt — a common size — the area affected by the same radiation dose of 100 rads perimeter would encompass an about 20 times larger area or about 30 to 40,000 square kilometres! The consequences of a nuclear bomb explosion on a storage tank could be even more disastrous and result in doses exceeding 100 rads in an area of more than 50,000 square kilometres.

It is thus quite obvious that the damage inflicted on countries where many reactors are in operation and many more are being built or planned would be disastrous indeed. Attacks on nuclear facilities would make practically the whole of these and neighbouring countries uninhabitable for years or decades.

Attacks on nuclear facilities involve risks for mass destruction in many countries where such facilities exist and in neighbouring countries as well. These risks exist right now. I do not have to remind anyone here that this is a means of warfare that does not necessarily require the possession of nuclear weapons on the part of the attacking side.

An agreement on the prohibition of attacks, including nuclear attacks on nuclear facilities should be simple and straightforward. Attacks on nuclear reactors, reprocessing facilities, spent fuel storages and waste deposits on land should be prohibited. My delegation will present a concrete proposal in these terms.

On the question of the link between tracks A and B, the Swedish position is rather flexible. Originally the Swedish delegation considered the track B proposal as a specification to draft article III in the United States/USSR proposal of 1979. But other solutions to secure the link are possible. Substance is more important than form.