

between language as a real subject, conveying substance of thought, and logic. It is thus logic in a concrete form, and it is language in its abstract form. As such it disciplines; and where there is discipline there is necessarily also *training* of the intelligence.

The question now arises—and it is of great significance in education—Can I not *train* the intelligence without disciplining it by means of the formal or abstract? Is there any distinction between training and discipline which can justify me in saying that I can train without disciplining? I think there is, and the question is so important in its general educational bearings, as well as its linguistic, that I shall here introduce you to what I believe to be the true distinction between these words, which are almost always used as equivalent; and, in doing so, I shall necessarily make clearer what I have said about the formal or abstract.

Language studied as the substance of thought is *food* for the mind; but it is so only in so far as it is comprehended. Now, this act of comprehension carries the intelligence through a mental process. This process is necessarily the grammatical and logical process in the concrete, for language is the reflex not merely of thought but of the thinking process. But there are various stages of comprehension, rising from the vague and indefinite feeling that something has been said, to the partial and fragmentary understanding of what has been said (and this stage again has many degrees), and to the final grasping of the thought in all its particularity and fulness. When a piece of language is so grasped that the thought it conveys is reduced in the mind of the reader to that order and relative subordination of parts which it had when it first took complete shape in words, the reader has manifestly carried his mind

through the mental processes which originally produced the thought and its word-vestment. Now, to the extent to which my mind is carried through such processes of thinking, it is, I hold, being *trained* as well as fed. This is training; let us now restate by way of contrast the nature of discipline.

It is only in so far as we look at the *relations* of the word-vestment apart from the concrete thought that we deal with the formal in thought and language—the abstract—the logical and grammatical. It is this occupation of the mind with form which, as I have tried to show, gives *discipline* to the intelligence as distinct from *training* (though it necessarily also comprehends training).

The fixing of the mind on the formal or the abstract, on thinking deprived of the support of the concrete, is a difficult exercise of mind, and rightly not attempted till boys have left school. It is formal logic. The fixing of mind on the generalized character of words and their inter-relations in a sentence is also a difficult exercise; but this, which is grammar and grammatical analysis, is not beyond the reach of the schoolboy, because his mind is supported by the symbols which we call words, and these are presented to his senses. It is by such exercises that we give what is to be distinctively called discipline. We thus strengthen reason for all particular exercises of whatsoever kind. For the subject-matter of formal exercises is not necessarily this or that *particular* thought or reasoned statement, but thinking, and reasoning, and the conditions of the rational expression through words as such. Formal exercises are thus universal in their relations and extend the range of mental power simply as power, and, while extending, also intensify the power.

The distinction between training and discipline is, I hope, made clear.