

frontiers. The dispute between these two sections of Afrikanerdom over this precise issue has already surfaced.

However, should South Africa's armies become deeply engaged in Mozambique, it is reasonable to suppose that their action would not only create a different situation in Southern Africa but affect international opinion and policies.

Internal threats

Apart from these external threats to Rhodesia's security, there is also the likelihood of internal threats. These could come, as already indicated, from a more effective guerrilla strategy linked to growing black bitterness inside the country. There is, unfortunately, no reason to suppose that black feelings can become anything but more hostile under a regime such as Mr. Smith's.

A serious source of internal disaffection is the steady growth of black unemployment. Already an estimated one million of Rhodesia's 5.4 million black population are unemployed and their numbers are added to annually by 45,000 school-leavers. (An interesting and possibly significant factor, too, is the increasing exodus of young white Rhodesians who see no future for themselves in the present society.) There are other serious causes for black frustration, arising from lack of educational and social disabilities.

It is indisputably true that maintaining sanctions will hit black Rhodesians harder than whites and, in the short run, will further worsen their condition; but their disabilities precede the application of sanctions. The fundamental nature of a minority-ruled society is to favour its own kith and kin over the majority. In the long term, only a fundamental change in Rhodesia's power structure can bring meaningful change to its black citizens.

Impact of sanctions

Economic sanctions have begun to bite; those who judge Rhodesia's economy from its shop-windows or by the officially published statistics, miss the deeper significance of the damage done to the core of the country's economy. These have been carefully described in the report recently published by the Africa Bureau, London. The best brief description of Rhodesia's difficulties is to be found in the following statement made by Mr. Smith himself when, on November 26, 1971, he defended the Anglo-Rhodesian proposals at a conference of the Rhodesian Front:

"If only Rhodesians could be apprised of the facts and predictions available to

Government — our economic requirements and anticipated development difficulties and the security problems which loom before us — then they would more readily understand our position. Rhodesia could have gone on without a settlement and her position would not have been prejudiced this year or next. But it is our assessment that in ten or 20 years' time the position would not be so good for our children."

The failure of the Anglo-Rhodesian negotiations has not changed that position — except that the more effective application of sanctions could considerably reduce the time-scale indicated by Mr. Smith.

Sanctions, as I have already suggested, will not by themselves suffice to defeat the Smith regime. What, then, is the case for persisting with sanctions?

First, because it is the only policy that guarantees virtual international agreement in treating the Smith regime as an outlaw within the world community; not a single country (not even Portugal or South Africa) has recognized it diplomatically. Second, because of this isolation, Rhodesia has been denied access to the world's money markets, which are indispensable to its long-term survival. Third, it has served the purpose of denying outright victory to the rebels and of preventing them from solidifying their control; they are kept economically weak, and politically and militarily insecure. Fourth, it has been the only effective pressure to make white Rhodesians even consider a negotiated settlement. Fifth, it has sustained the morale of the black and white opponents of the regime. Sixth, it has prevented further polarizing of African and Western opinion over the problems of Southern Africa's white-ruled states.

All this mounts up to a fairly substantial vindication of sanctions. But why have sanctions not operated more effectively in the past?

Because South Africa and Portugal have, from the first, refused to co-operate and have provided markets and trade channels to the outside world. Because the main effects have been shifted off white shoulders on to those of black Rhodesians, who have been forced to rely even more on subsistence agriculture. Because, for diverse reasons, the world community did not match Britain's own efforts, which, by and large, have been exemplary. Because the African states in the past lacked confidence in the credibility of British policy and so failed to exert pressures at the United Nations on those countries and had defaulted on sanctions. Finally, because the UN sanctions machinery has been almost

Internal factors include exodus of young whites, growth of jobless in ranks of blacks