

she interposed nothing whatever in the way of an attack upon it, but merely presented a claim, after the advertisement had run, or was running; and because the sheriff disregarded her claim, she having had one claim, and it being disposed of by decree, she then files a bill against the sheriff after the sale was effected, and tries to prevent him from putting the purchaser in possession; and in that bill she makes no attack upon the decree, says nothing about it or against it in any way; and finally, when a bill is brought against her, she makes an answer to it, and says nothing about having the decree set aside, does not use her answer as a cross-bill, makes no prayer to vacate the decree, but afterward, when the case has been pending for years, from 1881, the time her first answer was filed, to 1887, she comes by amendment to her answer, with a cross-bill, attacks the decree in this feeble way, and prays that it be opened and set aside. Now thus much would not be done for any other suitor. There is no man who could avoid a decree for such cause as she sets up; then why should this lady be indulged in so doing? We dare not decide a question of right by a rule of courtesy, or substitute deference to sex for deference to law. The counsel of record, representing married women in pending litigation, have as ample power to bind their clients in conducting and disposing of such litigation as have the counsel of other suitors. And decrees rendered by consent of counsel, without fraud, are obligatory upon their clients, the consent of counsel being in law the consent of the parties they represent. A case very much in point is *Lewis v. Gunn*, 63 Ga. 542. Other relevant cases are *Mashburn v. Gouge*, 61 Ga. 512; *Glover v. Moore*, 60 id. 189; *Wingfield v. Rhea*, 73 id. 477. As to the powers of counsel, see *Wade v. Powell*, 31 Ga. 1; *Lyon v. Williams*, 42 id. 168; Ga. Sup. Ct., Jan. 16, 1888; *Williams v. Simmons*. Opinion by Bleckley, C.J.—*Albany Law Journal*.