

*Supply*

warheads in place until the SS-20s were deployed. Then there were the SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5. Two weeks ago the Russians made an offer to get rid of the SS-4 and the SS-5 and to reduce the SS-20 to the number equivalent to that which the French and British have, that is, 594, almost 600. The Russians said they would reduce their SS-20 warheads to the number that were there before 1963.

The SS-20 is a much less dangerous weapon, with only one-seventh of the capability of the SS-4 and the SS-5. It is much more stable in the sense that it is mobile, cannot be destroyed and does not have to be used as a first strike. It is an arms controller's dream. Are we not in a much better position today with this offer than we were in 1963 when we removed these missiles? Is this not an approach we might accept in terms of the negotiations?

**Miss MacDonald:** Mr. Speaker, I will not ask the Member to repeat the question. He asks that I remember back to 1963. I remember 1963 very well. It was at that time that the Liberal Government wanted to install Bomarc missiles in Canada. The Party of which I am part stood very staunchly against that. We did not want nuclear weapons in Canada at that time or at any time since.

With regard to the hypothetical position the Hon. Member has put forward, as far as I am concerned the role that Canada can take in this is to look at the situation that now exists in Britain and in France. That is one of the major stumbling blocks in the negotiations in Geneva, the missiles that are deployed in those countries at the present time. I would sooner see us use every bit of influence and power that we have to try to bring these countries into some discussion on what would happen in the balance between East and West that could incorporate the missiles that are presently deployed by those countries. I may say that that was a proposal put forward just the other day by Lord Carrington, the former foreign minister of Britain. If we were to advocate something like that and see it come to a successful conclusion, we might break some of the deadlock that presently exists in Geneva.

**Miss Jewett:** Mr. Speaker, I found the Hon. Member's address very interesting. I would agree with a great deal of it. In fact, I hope everyone in the House would agree that enormous emphasis must be placed on Canada's participation, providing ideas, assistance and so on for arms control negotiations.

I wonder if the former Minister would have something to say about the testing of the Cruise in the context of the negotiations, both INF and START. Although the air-launched Cruise missile is not yet in the START negotiating structure, it certainly was in SALT II and I hope would come again.

Because it is the air launch that we are being asked to test, would she not see some merit for putting off any decision to test until we see more about the progress of the negotiations in Geneva which may take many months? I know she spoke of four years, but negotiations were not going on a lot of that time.

Even though the Hon. Member does not want Canada to play a non-nuclear role in the alliance, which would include not testing, does she not see some merit in putting this way off down the line while the very negotiations that she feels very strongly about are going on?

● (1720)

**Miss MacDonald:** Mr. Speaker, not only do I feel strongly about the arms control negotiations now, I felt strongly about them when that decision was made in 1979. If there is one great regret that I have, it is that we in Canada have treated the arms control negotiations as a secondary issue and have focused the attention of the country on the testing of a weapons system rather than the other way around. The important issue is surely how we can bring some control and reduction to nuclear weapons.

That we will come to a breakthrough in the negotiations within the next few months is not yet apparent, although there has been some minor movement, but if I were to see that we were anywhere near a major breakthrough that would then not necessitate the deployment of Cruise missiles or Pershing missiles in western Europe, I would certainly advocate that the negotiations continue for a limited period of time. No one would be so foolish as to turn down a possibility and a hope of that nature.

**Mr. Allmand:** Mr. Speaker, I have listened very closely to the hon. lady and I was pleased to hear—

**Miss MacDonald:** Member will do.

**Mr. Allmand:** Excuse me, I apologize to the Hon. Member. I was pleased to hear her say that there was nothing in the 1979 NATO agreement which obliged Canada to test any nuclear weapon. I would like to ask first if, according to her experience and her assessment, under the first track of the 1979 agreement which was to maintain the balance of power and deterrents, it is necessary to develop the Cruise missile system. Does she not agree that NATO now has enough nuclear power to obliterate the Soviet Union? In other words, is it necessary to move ahead with these weapons under that policy?

My second question is with respect to the second track of the agreement, which was to pursue arms control and disarmament. Does she believe that the NATO alliance, in the last couple of years, has been faithful to the 1979 commitment by pursuing that side of the policy with enough vigour and commitment?

Finally, after listening to the Hon. Member's speech, I must say that I am not too sure which side she is voting for. Is she voting for the motion or against the motion? I did not hear that.

**Miss MacDonald:** Mr. Speaker, I will begin by answering the last part of the Hon. Member's question. I will be voting against the motion. I want the Hon. Member to know that from the outset I have said that if the arms control negotiations are not successful, then I feel that Canada should, as part