

(SAMs) were despatched to Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Romania, Ukraine, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). The SAMs were responsible for working with local customs officials to interdict illegal cross-border trade, and by all accounts, they were remarkably successful. Their success was due in large part to the further innovation of a sanctions assistance mission communications centre, or SAMCOMM. Using advanced communications equipment, SAMCOMM was able to notify all concerned parties of suspected illegal activity, and to facilitate the passage of legal commerce through checkpoints.

The SAM/SAMCOMM system could be replicated in other contexts. It is, however, very cost- and labour-intensive, and depends on the willingness of member states and (preferably) regional organizations to assist in coordinating and supplying the operation. Where regional organizations lack the resources to do so, this system will demand more creative innovations on the part of the international community. Stremlau argues that "the Yugoslav case, by demonstrating the level of effort required for a credible and reasonably effective sanctions regime, will likely reinforce the reluctance of Security Council members to push for future Chapter VII collective actions."⁸¹

Three more points must be made about monitoring and enforcement. First, as previously noted, the increased prominence of financial sanctions will require new means of sanctions monitoring and enforcement. This will require the advice of forensic accountants, bankers, and computer experts. It will also demand a much broader scope of multilateral cooperation, given the ease with which these sanctions can be circumvented if even one sender defects from the coalition.

Second, although trade embargoes seem to have fallen out of favour, issues of physical monitoring and enforcement are still pertinent to the effective use of arms embargoes. These have been particularly porous in the past; the arms embargoes against Somalia, Rwanda, Liberia, and Angola (UNITA) have been described by one UN official as "atrophic." Unfortunately, the less comprehensive a sanctions regime is, the less incentive there is for states to bear the costs of a large-scale SAM/SAMCOMM type of operation. Sophisticated methods of satellite reconnaissance and intelligence operations are helpful in this context, but there is no substitute for ground-level interdiction of arms.

Finally, it is important for sanctions committees to take advantage of whatever reliable intelligence they can gather regarding violations, regardless of its source. In many cases, the media have played an important role in identifying and bringing to light suspected violations of sanctions. This is all the more significant given that states do not typically like to embarrass one another in this manner. Because of vague and haphazard sanctions committee regulations, however, there have been occasions where media-identified violations were ignored. In Yugoslavia, members of the UN secretariat were allowed to bring news reports of violations to the attention of the sanctions committee. In Iraq, however, committee regulations decreed that

⁸¹ Stremlau, section five.