

interacting with humanitarians (convoy protection, information, rescue, etc.) for the sake of reputation, there is no contractual relationship demanding or even governing this interaction. Similarly, accountability rests in the relationship between the state client and the security provider, not the humanitarian organization. There can be no line of redress. In sum, as noted by one EO official "We are a commercial venture. We are not an aid agency".<sup>37</sup>

On another level, political pressure placed on contracting governments also limits humanitarians' reliance. The United Nations, for instance, did not engage EO in dialogue, despite the stability it brought to Angola and Sierra Leone, for fear of the label of collusion.<sup>38</sup> To sustain the pressure on contracting governments, the respective rebel movements, União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) and Revolutionary United Front (RUF), both demanded that the contracts cease as part of any peace agreement. In the end for both cases, EO was forced to leave, peace broke down, the United Nations was unable to stabilize the situation, and fighting resumed. As for humanitarian operations, the renewed fighting forced a severe restriction of activities, compelling humanitarians to limit their work largely in the Luanda and Freetown areas due to theft and banditry. Therefore, PSCs that can provide stability for humanitarian operations cannot, under current conditions, be expected to follow humanitarian wishes or humanitarian timetables.

### ***Long Term Implications for Future Research***

There are three general areas where growing interaction between humanitarians and private security providers may have implications for humanitarianism worthy of future study. First, despite the inability or unwillingness of states to provide troops for humanitarian operations except for areas of national interest, a shifted reliance on private firms to provide top cover may be similarly limiting. While beyond the scope of this paper to delve into the triangular relationship between private security firms, mining operations, and governments, it is obviously clear that PSCs will only work for clients able to pay, usually the few states with access to lucrative and stable proceeds from gem and precious metal mining. Similar to those rulers in the 14th-16th Centuries who, wishing to hire Swiss mercenaries but possessing only limited means, were met with the response "*kein Geld, kein Schweizer*", leaders in the developing world in need of private expertise face the harsh realities of the business environment. Also, in their drive to achieve legitimacy, not only will PSCs providing top cover accept only state clients, they also will not accept clients who are either peripheral states or on unfriendly terms with other state clients. In 1997, this is seen doubly in the former Zaire where EO declined working with the Mobutu government due to the infamy of the regime and its long time support for UNITA.<sup>39</sup>

The potential effect on humanitarianism in need of monitoring would be that in growing reliant on PSCs to provide top cover, the provision of humanitarian assistance would be based on business calculations rather than on the basis of need. While at the micro level humanitarians

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<sup>37</sup> Cited in Kevin Whitelaw, "Have Gun, Will Prop Up Regime," US News & World Report (20 January 1997), pp. 46-48.

<sup>38</sup> David Shearer, "Outsourcing War," Foreign Policy (Number 112, Fall 1998), p. 76.

<sup>39</sup> Zarate, "The Emergence of a New Dog of War," p. 149.