

involved in the reduction of American nuclear forces in Europe, Table 4 indicates the improbability of this proposal from an American point of view. American planners would be faced with the choice of removing a large number of these forces from the European theatre without a commensurate reduction in Soviet theatre forces, or of accepting disproportionate reductions in their central strategic forces (those based in the US). In turn, such disproportionate reductions would, de facto, dismantle the triad. There is little possibility, therefore, either in political or strategic terms, that the inclusion of theatre forces will be acceptable to the US.

C. American Force Reductions Excluding LRINF

Table 5 assumes that negotiations led to the exclusion of the American LRINF from the definition of strategic forces. It then assumes that the US would choose to maintain the current proportions of its triad, where, it will be noted, a high percentage of warheads (50%) are on submarines, whereas a high percentage of launchers (51%) and a relatively low percentage of warheads (18%) are ICBMs. Essentially, this internal asymmetry creates considerable dilemmas for the US in drawing down its forces. To meet the warhead ceilings, and to maintain the triad, the US would face the following problems:

- (1) If it maintains its ICBM warhead totals at approximately the same level (18% or 1050 after reductions), in order to maintain its ICBM launcher percentage it must retain its older Minuteman II missiles. The US could achieve the proportionate reduction ceiling using only 355 Minuteman III and Minuteman III Mark 12A. Other things being equal, this would make the US ICBM force even more vulnerable to a counter-force strike by Soviet SS-18 and 19s. In Table 5 therefore, the number of ICBM launchers has been increased by including the single warhead Minuteman II. The US could then maintain 500 ICBM launchers while reducing to a 6000 warhead total. The existing proportions of its warhead triad could be maintained without significant variation in