

(Mr. Morel, France)

towards deterring any party to the convention which might be tempted to cheat, and also persuading non-signatory States that they cannot gain a clear advantage by staying outside the convention.

The corollary of this particular provision is of course that this single production facility must be declared from the date of entry into force of the convention and placed under international control until its destruction at the end of the 10-year period.

The main characteristics of the security stock having thus been set out, I will merely add that our document describes the setting-up arrangements when the two distinct régimes come into force: the régime for security stocks, as just outlined, and the régime for stockpiles other than security stocks, in accordance with the provisions at present being negotiated in the draft convention. It also sets out how, after eight years, when all other stocks and related facilities have been destroyed, a start would be made on the simultaneous destruction of security stocks and each single production facility.

Let me now turn to verification, which is obviously one of the essential elements of the system proposed. Since this is a transitory régime and one which is at odds with the ultimate aim of the convention, it is indispensable to ensure that it cannot be diverted from its final purpose. Verification is of decisive importance for the whole of the convention, but it is of course particularly significant for security stocks.

I will not return here to the production facility which is under permanent international control and which will be closed down during the ninth year and destroyed before the end of the tenth year. This is a relatively simple case of complete verification — "unlimited", one might say -- whereas the definition of the verification régime for the security stock is inevitably a matter of greater complexity. As a matter of principle the security stock must be subject to challenge inspection. But, as can be seen from the current work of the Conference on this subject, access to storage facilities has led to the search for balance between security considerations (and confidentiality) on the one hand, and the need to ensure full respect for the convention on the other. Our latest exchanges of views have shown that there is no ready-made a priori formula, but that it should be possible to establish a régime which is both strict and balanced and which will ensure effective and realistic verification.

We believe therefore that the verification régime for security stocks is simply one special case within the more general framework of verification of the convention, and that it does not merit special treatment. That is why we have refrained in this document from defining a single and therefore final formula, and have set out, together with the formula we prefer, other options which are less satisfactory in our view. The choice to be made between these various options will of course depend on the answers to three major questions.

The first, a particularly sensitive one, is that of location. In our wish to take part in an open exercise which would make it possible to appreciate, before choosing, the advantages and drawbacks of the various possible formulae, we are ready to envisage the declaration of the location of