

(Mr. Busby, United States)

We welcome Soviet willingness to provide a detailed declaration of the contents of stockpiles, along the lines advocated by a majority of delegations, including my own. It is to be hoped that the remaining unagreed points can be quickly resolved.

We also welcome the Soviet proposal for the establishment of special storage sites at stockpile destruction facilities and for the monitoring of these sites by systematic international on-site inspection on a quota basis. In this connection, we would like to ask the Soviet delegation to clarify which stocks would be located at the special storage sites. In addition, would all stocks be moved to these locations promptly after entry into force? Or would the special storage sites contain only some of the stocks at any given time, for example, those stocks to be destroyed in the next stage of the schedule for stockpile destruction?

We also listened with interest to the explanation of the Soviet concept of inspection on a quota basis for stockpile destruction, particularly the criteria which were given. As outlined in the United States Working Paper CD/387, our conclusions are different. But the criteria on which the United States conclusions are based are similar. For us a major problem with the Soviet approach is that the actual level of verification would not be known until after entry into force. We are being asked to undertake a commitment to disarm without having an agreement on verification levels. We would expect the Soviet delegation to take this concern into account.

On the other hand, the proposals to single out binary chemical weapons stocks and production facilities for specially severe treatment seem to my delegation to be extraordinarily one-sided. They can only be seen as efforts to preserve Soviet Chemical Weapons capabilities while eliminating those of the United States. What else is one to think of the Soviet proposal whose effect would be to eliminate totally United States binary production facilities within two years after entry into force and not even to begin elimination of Soviet Chemical Weapons production facilities until eight years after entry into force? Surely the Soviet delegation recognizes that such proposals cannot advance the work of the Committee.

I promised to make some suggestions for making the Committee's work more productive next year.

Clearly, it will be essential for delegations to come with instructions which will enable them to negotiate on all of the issues. We think that the five-months recess should provide adequate time for thorough preparation.

We believe that the working group should be re-established promptly when the Committee on Disarmament reconvenes, regardless of the status of other procedural issues and other working groups. Work on a chemical weapons ban must not be held hostage to disputes over unrelated issues. We must not repeat the sad experience of this session.

In our view the Working Group must next year try to come to grips with each of the four major problem areas: scope of prohibition, including non-use; stockpiles; chemical weapons production facilities; and non-production of chemical weapons, particularly in the chemical industry. We would favour continuing the type of broadly based contact groups instituted in 1983. The record of the negotiations prepared under the leadership of Ambassador McPhail, and the reports of the 1982 and 1983 Contact Groups should be the starting-point for this work.