

This pledge to an "open invitation" for inspections is not made lightly. We make it because it is indispensable to an effective chemical weapons ban. The essence of verification is deterrence of violations through the risk of detection. The "open invitation" procedures will increase the chances that violations will be detected and the chances that, in the event of violations, the evidence necessary for an appropriate international response can be collected. That is the heart of deterring violations.

If the international community recognizes that such a provision is the sine qua non of an effective chemical weapons ban and joins us in subscribing to it, we will not only have realized the noble longing for a treaty that actually bans chemical weapons, but we will have changed in an altogether salutary manner the way governments do business.

We will have set a bold example for overcoming barriers that impede effective arms control in other areas. And we will have engendered the kind of openness among nations that dissipates these ungrounded suspicions and allows peace to breathe and thrive.

We recognize that all governments have secrets. Some speak as if openness and effective verification cut against their interests alone. But openness entails burdens for every State, every single State, including the United States of America. Openness of the kind we are proposing for the chemical weapons ban would come at a price.

But an effective ban on chemical weapons requires this kind of "open invitation" inspections we propose. We, our President, the United States Government, are willing to pay the price of such openness. The enormous value of an effective ban warrants our doing so.

I know that the United States delegation to this body is eager for the process of negotiating a chemical weapons ban to begin to unfold. We hope and trust that the seriousness of this work, its urgency and, perhaps most of all, the humane aspirations of the peoples represented here, will spur all in this Conference towards an early and successful agreement.

We do not underestimate the difficulties that this task presents. I have said that the key to an effective convention — a convention that could eliminate the possibility of chemical warfare forever — is enforcement of compliance through effective verification.

Our emphasis on this point (and our "open invitation" verification proposal) springs from a desire that the ban work permanently and effectively, to provide the security that all of us seek.

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One of the measures to strengthen mutual confidence in compliance with disarmament agreements, and thus international confidence, is verification, as is well known, and we would like to dwell on this in particular today. The Soviet concept of verification is based on the following: the main function of the system assuring compliance with the disarmament agreements, an integral part of which is verification, consists in ensuring confidence in their implementation by all parties to the agreements, and through certain forms of co-operation facilitating the settlement of disputes, thus providing for honest implementation by all States parties of their undertakings, and building confidence between them. The forms and conditions of verification or control envisaged in any specific agreement depend upon the purposes, scope and nature of a given agreement and are determined by them.

We approach the questions of verification concretely and not in terms of general declarations or abstract views. This approach of ours has been enshrined in the strategic arms limitation agreements, as well as in other existing agreements in the field of disarmament. Our policy on questions of verification is far-reaching.

As Comrade K.U. Chernenko stressed recently, "considering the policy and practice