

expedite agreement by placing additional international pressure on the Soviet Union, and will also include other countries which possess or are capable of producing chemical weapons.

A chart is included which provides a detailed comparison of US and Soviet positions on various aspects of a comprehensive chemical weapons ban. In each instance, the Soviet Union and US differ on their respective provisions for verification and a general concern for the effectiveness of the treaty. It is not clear how the Soviet Union will be able to provide adequate verification of the destruction of stockpiles without some form of on-site inspection, yet no provisions are made; they discuss only the 'possibility' of some form of on-site inspection.

The Soviet refusal to accept verification proposals acted to delay agreement while US stockpiles were continually deteriorating. It is possible then, that the Soviets never intended to conclude an agreement, and were simply stalling until an agreement was no longer necessary from their point of view (i.e. when US stockpiles would no longer pose a threat to the Soviet Union). The author states that the US is seriously pursuing a chemical weapons ban, but an 'effective guarantee' for compliance must precede disarmament.