

not tell. In politics and in public society, oppression is relative. To attempt to scare Buonaparté with the jealousy of other powers, is, perhaps, still more ridiculous? Those who have any power, are his associates in despoiling those who have none. What benefit could the change of the name of a chief produce to Great Britain, or to Europe? Would a General Moreau or a Masena be less a Frenchman than Buonaparté? No,—but we say they may be less *habile*! When the ability of enemies becomes a consideration with Britons, then alas! our legislators may go home and plant potatoes.

It must be evident to the world, that the present rulers of the republic, from whatever point of view they are taken, can only be considered as rebel chiefs. They were born subjects of their king, most of them held offices in his service, and at mature age, swore allegiance to his government; he is alive, and at this time is morally, as well entitled to sit on the throne of France, as any hereditary monarch can be to sit on the throne of his ancestors. These usurpers know, that, however pliable and passive the politics of other governments may have, now and then, appeared, it cannot be presumed that legitimate sovereigns should prostitute the dignity of their stations, and expose the safety of their persons and families in so palpable a manner, as voluntarily to sanction the rebellion, robberies, pillage, and plunder of the republic; and associate in treaties of friendship and mutual support, with the irreconcilable enemies of all legal government. The chief consul knows, that the treaties which he has imposed upon other states, are extorted bonds, and will never bind the conscience. He is well aware, that when his authority in France has occasion for help from

abroad, his part of the drama will be nearly out. Nor can he suppose that his neighbours are less sensible that the support of France implies her dominion. In short, he knows that his authority can only be legalized by ultimate success; and that *while any legal government possesses the means of opposition and resistance, the success of the French Republic cannot be considered as secure.* The consul may profess peace and friendship with all states; and he may offer alliances to the great, and protection to the weak; but every legitimate sovereign should know, that when the missionaries of Buonaparté approach his throne, they come either to spoil, crush, or undermine it. The destruction, or subjugation of all independent nations, especially of all rival powers, is with the rulers of France, a principal of self-preservation, and is, therefore, interwoven with the very existence of their military community.

We would not be understood to say, that the present government of France intends to conquer, and incorporate with the Republic, all other European states. On the contrary, we do not suppose that the consulate would with Holland, Spain, nor perhaps Italy, more immediately under the police of France than those countries now are: nor, do we believe, that while Great Britain and Russia continue in their present posture, Buonaparté would countenance a farther reduction of Austria, nor the expulsion of the Turkish government from Europe. We consider the real system of the French Republic, to be neither more nor less, than, *an universal ascendancy raised upon natural sources sufficient to maintain a preponderant power.* Such an ascendancy is essential to the existence of the Republic, and it will be pursued as long, as that fabric does exist. The obstacles which stands most